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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the impact that public policy and private services have
on crime and social norms. In the first two chapters, I evaluate the effect of late night
transportation options on the incidence of crime. Chapter 1 studies a temporary
late night public transportation program in the city of Boston. Using public transit
ridership information, I provide evidence of both direct and behavioral effects of the
program on late night ridership. While I find that the launch of late night service
did not alter the occurrence of crime, I show that its termination led to a significant
decline in violent crime. The asymmetric effect is likely due to the presence of a ride-
sharing platform when the program was terminated, but not when it was launched.
With the spatial information included in the crime data, I further confirm that the
effect was concentrated in Boston's nightlife areas. Overall, my results indicate a
shift from public transportation to ride-sharing services that reduce the risk of violent
encounters.
In Chapter 2, I examine the effect of a ride-sharing service on violent crime in college
towns. I use multiple data sources to create a unique college-town crime dataset
and ultimately find that the availability of ride-sharing facilitated a decline in simple
v
assault. The findings of both chapters are complementary and suggest, that private
provision of safe and affordable transportation is particularly beneficial at night when
public transit is insufficient and involves security risks.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the effect of a father-specific parental leave policy reform
in Quebec, Canada. A simple theoretical framework describes two channels through
which the reform may affect gender-specific labor market outcomes. Consistent with
the gender-norm channel, I find that the reform led to an increase in the probability
of employment for women of all ages. Reduction in younger males' wages serves as
evidence of the statistical discrimination channel. The analysis implies that public
policy can promote gender equality through its direct effects on fathers, but also
through its indirect effects on the opportunities for women in the labor market.
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1Chapter 1
The Effect of Late Night Transportation on
Crime in Boston
1.1 Introduction
Public officials are increasingly interested in promoting the growth of the nightlife
economy, as it constitutes a valuable sector generating fiscal revenues and job oppor-
tunities.1 A nightlife-enhancing policy that has been implemented in many major
cities throughout the US is the late night extension of public transportation. While
it provides residents and tourists with convenient access to and from the nightlife
areas, it fosters concern over whether such provisions come at the cost of increasing
crime.2 Late night public transportation may also entice more people to go out, stay
out longer, and increase alcohol consumption. Since alcohol intoxication is a major
risk factor for violent crime, affordable late night transit could increase the likelihood
of crimes such as bar fights. In the US in particular, the majority of homicides stem
from minor conflicts, so even simple assaults constitute a serious concern.3 (Alvarez
and Bachman 2016) Therefore, public programs that increase the likelihood of just
minor misdemeanors would come with a notably high cost in the US due to the po-
1. Some cities have created a new nightlife manager administrative position to balance policies
that foster and enhance nightlife with related issues such as noise or public safety. (Rocheleau 2017)
2. The safety concern is especially pronounced because most violent crime occurs at night.
Twenty-four percent of all violent crimes committed by adult offenders occur between 8 p.m. and
midnight. (OJJDP 2018)
3. The availability of a deadly weapon tends to be the main variable separating lethal and non-
lethal incidents. (Alvarez and Bachman 2016)
2tential escalation of such conflicts.
My project aims to advance the existing literature by providing empirical evidence
on late night crime dynamics in urban areas with respect to the set of transporta-
tion options. I use Boston's temporary extension of late night public transportation,
called the Late Night Service (LNS), as well as variation in the availability of the
popular ride-sharing service Uber POOL to study the late night rates of property
and violent crime. This study provides three main contributions. First, I establish
a causal link between late night transportation options and violent crime in urban
areas. Second, I show that late night transportation's impact on crime is dependent
on the spatial location and availability of late night transportation options. Third,
my findings provide new evidence on the benefits of ride-sharing, which is relevant to
a growing pool of literature.
The unique timing of LNS and Uber POOL in Boston, depicted in Figure 1·1, allows
me to conduct causal analyses of two quasi-experiments. I examine the impact of the
2014 LNS launch on late night crime. Since Uber POOL was not available in Boston
until August 2015, the alternative transportation options available during the time
of the first analysis were limited to the more expensive ride-share options or taxis.
While I confirm that LNS increased ridership by an average of about 6,500 riders per
late weekend night, I am not able to reject the null hypothesis when evaluating the
impact of the LNS launch on crime. The inconclusive result may be explained by
the presence of channels that cause an increase in crime as well as channels that lead
to a reduction in crime. As mentioned above, LNS indirectly leads to an increase in
alcohol consumption, which is a risk factor for violent crime; at the same time, LNS
provides a relatively safe late night transportation option compared to some of the
alternatives, which reduces the likelihood of violent crime. Although I am not able
to test for their presence, the ambiguity of the empirical analysis suggests that the
3channels may offset each other.
Next, I investigate the impact of the 2016 LNS termination on late night crime, when
a relatively close substitute (Uber POOL) operated in Boston. I find that the termina-
tion of LNS led to a reduction in violent crime by 1.9 incidents per late weekend night,
which is equivalent to a 45 percent reduction. The magnitude of the effect is consis-
tent across OLS and Poisson estimations. Finally, neither of my quasi-experiments
reveal a significant effect of LNS on property crime, likely due to the nature of the
program.
To the best of my knowledge, the only other study that analyzes late night pub-
lic transportation and crime is Jackson and Owens (2011). Their work exploits the
19992003 gradual expansion of weekend late night public transportation in Wash-
ington, DC and evaluates its impact on DUIs and other alcohol-related arrests. The
authors find that the availability of late night transportation increased alcohol con-
sumption and decreased alcohol-impaired driving in the city. My study differs from
Jackson and Owens (2011) across multiple dimensions. While I am focusing on a dif-
ferent set of crime outcomes, I am also able to explore the effect of public transporta-
tion with and without the competition of a relatively new and popular ride-sharing
service. Also, I include an intermediate step in the analysis, in which I evaluate
the impact of LNS on MBTA ridership. By utilizing detailed MBTA ridership in-
formation, I show the extent to which LNS affected weekend ridership patterns both
directly and indirectly. This additional step enhances the main crime analysis since
I define the duration of the treatment time period based on the ridership findings.
Therefore, I take an extra precaution to include only the late night weekend hours
during which more people leave late night venues and begin their journey home using
public transportation.
The spatial information on crime incidents allows me to investigate the heteroge-
4neous impact of LNS. I calculate crime incidents' distances from two sets of hot
spots4MBTA stops and late night venues. The LNS launch impact remains in-
significant, independent of distance from the hot spots, while the reduction in violent
crime due to LNS termination is driven by the areas within 200 meters from the hot
spots. Together, these results indicate that the substitution of public transportation
with Uber POOL due to the cancellation of LNS decreases violent encounters related
to departure from the nightlife areas. The conclusion I draw from is that late night
crime depends on the amount of time that intoxicated people spend waiting for a ride
home or otherwise congregating at the end of their night. Uber POOL currently rep-
resents the most affordable and widespread service, minimizing the above-mentioned
duration.
The findings do not provide support for the popular idea that public transportation
facilitates the spread of crime. The existing empirical evidence is mixed. Phillips and
Sandler's (2015) analysis of temporary rail closures in Washington, DC validates the
concern that public transportation increases specifically the prevalence of property
crime. However, other studies do not support the hypothesis. (Billings, Leland, and
Swindell 2011; Ihlanfeldt 2003) As stated above, the lack of LNS impact on property
crime may be caused by the particular design of the program (a relatively short ex-
tension on late weekend nights). However, at least in the specific case of late night
public transportation in Boston, the common concern that crime will spread does not
seem to be justified.
Finally, I contribute to the developing literature investigating the social benefits (or
lack thereof) related to the ride-sharing industry. My results are aligned with other
studies that mostly find a negative relationship between ride-sharing and criminal
offenses. Martin-Buck (2016) shows that the introduction of ride-sharing led to a
decline in alcohol-related car accidents, DUI arrests, as well as physical and sexual
4. Crime hot spots are areas where crime tends to concentrate.
5assaults in a large set of US cities. The author reveals that a greater reduction in
DUI arrests occurred in the subset of cities with lower public transit usage. Green-
wood and Wattal (2017) estimate that UberX reduced alcohol-related vehicle deaths
by 3.65.6 percent in California. Brazil and Kirk (2016), on the other hand, find no
association between Uber's launch in metropolitan counties and number of traffic fa-
talities. Finally, the work by Park et al. (2017) resembles this study since it focuses on
the case of a particular city. The authors utilize a unique Uber pick-up dataset from
New York City and find that ride-sharing reduces the likelihood of rape, particularly
in taxi-sparse areas. My findings add to this literature by showing that ride-sharing
can boost the nightlife economy by providing a convenient transportation option from
late night venues, thereby reducing the occurrence of violent crime in these areas.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 MBTA Late Night Service
The MBTA's Late Night Service extended the operation of the subway system as well
as the 15 bus routes used most heavily on weekend.5 It was rolled out on March
28, 2014, with a 90-minute extensionthe last trains and buses depart at 2:30 a.m.
instead of the former 1:00 a.m. The LNS was introduced as a one-year pilot program,
with an annual cost estimated at $16 million, that would be monitored by the MBTA
and open to a possible extension based on the response.6 (MBTA 2015)
The LNS represented the MBTA's second attempt at extending its operating hours.
The first program, called The Night Owl Service, was launched in 2001. It consisted
only of a bus service that operated along the subway and bus routes. The service
5. The extension included subway routes: Blue, Green, Orange, Red, and Silver Line, and bus
routes: 1, 15, 22, 23, 28, 32, 39, 57, 66, 71, 73, 111, and 116/117. (MBTA 2015)
6. The estimate was revised to $12.9 million after the first six months of the pilot's operation.
(MBTA 2015)
6was terminated in 2005 due to low ridership and budget constraints.7 (MBTA 2015)
The MBTA decided to expand its Boston service hours again in 2014 for two reasons:
high customer demand for late night service and the presence of late night public
transportation in comparable US cities.8
Despite the initial satisfaction with the pilot's performance, the LNS was found un-
sustainable as the MBTA struggled to finance its core services. LNS ridership neared
an average of 27,000 boardings per weekend during the first 41 weeks of its oper-
ationa substantial increase from the Night Owl Service ridership.9 However, the
average subsidy per LNS passenger exceeded $7 compared to the average of $0.84
for standard passengers. The LNS program was able to recover only 16.5 percent of
its costs with the revenue. Therefore, a year after the program's introduction, the
MBTA decided to form the Late Night Service Task Force in order to conduct an
interim review of the Late Night Service and offer service modification options. The
options presented by the task force included 1) charging a premium, 2) program elim-
ination, 3) sponsorship, and 4) reductions through service adjustments. After a set
of public meetings, the MBTA cut back the LNS to 2:00 a.m. from the original 2:30
a.m. effective on June 27, 2015. Additionally, five of the least beneficial bus routes
were eliminated.10 (WBUR News & Wire Services 2015)
The LNS stopped operations on March 18, 2016. That weekend, MBTA service went
back to its regular closing time at 1:00 a.m. The MBTA Fiscal and Management
Control Board made a unanimous decision to terminate the program due to declining
ridership, cost inefficiency, and insufficient maintenance time. (Price and Walrath
2016; WBUR News & Wire Services 2016) The termination of LNS prompted ad-
7. The Night Owl service recorded an average of 2,460 boardings per weekend in 2005. (MBTA
2015)
8. Late night or 24-hour services are offered by public transportation agencies in Chicago, Los
Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, DC (MBTA 2015)
9. Includes boardings between 12:30 a.m. until 3:00 a.m.
10. Routes 15, 22, 71, 73 and 77.
7vocacy groups to jointly file a federal complaint alleging a disproportionate burden
on minority and low-income populations.11 The complaint argued that the required
equity analysis conducted on behalf of the MBTA was flawed and that its conclu-
sions were invalid.12 However, the Federal Transit Administration concluded that the
MBTA conducted its equity analysis properly. (Thompson 2016) While alternative
services were discussed, the LNS was not followed up by any other late night program
until September 2018, when the MBTA launched its Late Night Bus Pilot. This third
attempt targets late night shift workers and includes routes to the outer suburbs.
(Atkinson 2018)
1.2.2 Ride-Sharing Services in Boston
Ride-sharing platforms have been enabled by developments in information technology
and have since quickly revolutionized the transportation industry. Their services rely
on smartphone applications to provide direct connections between passengers and
drivers. Similarly, as with other services in the sharing economy, the unprecedented
expansion of ride-sharing platforms has led to an academic and public policy discus-
sion over their potential social benefit and harm. While some areas in the US banned
ride-sharing companies from operating, others, including Massachusetts, established
legislation regulating their activity in a variety of ways.13
Regardless of the regulatory debate, however, ride-sharing services undoubtedly pro-
vide passengers with multiple benefits over existing market options: taxis, limousines,
11. The advocacy groups filing the federal complaint were The Conservation Law Foundation,
Alternatives for Community & Environment, and the Greater Four Corner Action Coalition.
12. Based on the Federal Transit Administration guidelines, transit providers must conduct anal-
ysis showing that major service changes do not disproportionately affect low-income and minority
populations. If the risk of such a bias is found, the agency has to find ways to mitigate the impact.
The MBTA, in fact, tried to cancel LNS without performing the equity analysis and only did so
after the Federal Transit Administration ordered it on March 6, 2016. (CLF and GFCAC 2016)
13. In 2016, Massachusetts statewide regulations imposed a two-tier background check system,
vehicle inspections, insurance coverage requirements, commercial toll rates for drivers, 20 cent sur-
charges per ride, and more. (Schoenberg 2016)
8and van services. The easy-to-use phone applications keep passengers updated on the
pick-up time as well as the expected duration of the ride. Passengers are able to track
the route their drivers take and set up automatic payments. The services use a dy-
namic pricing scheme, responding instantaneously to changes in supply and demand
in the area.
This study focuses on a service provided by Uber, the leading ride-sharing platform.
Compared to its primary competitor Lyft, Uber has "more than eight times Lyft's $1
billion in funding and several times Lyft's roughly 100,000 active drivers." (Bradley
2015) Importantly for my study, Uber has dominated Boston's ride-sharing market
with 97 percent market share as of July 2014.14 In late 2014, Uber reported having
10,000 active drivers in Boston, which heavily outnumbers the city's 1,825 licensed
taxis. (Hall and Krueger 2018; Nelson/Nygaard 2013) Uber is not only the most
important player in Boston's ride-sharing market, but it is also the pioneer behind
new services. Uber launched each of its services in Boston before Lyft introduced its
analogical service. In order to capture the effects of ride-sharing in Boston, focusing
on the variation in Uber's services is the determining factor.
Founded in 2009, Uber officially launched in San Francisco in 2010. (Uber 2010) Over
the years, it has introduced multiple services that varied in convenience and pricing.
The company started its Boston operations in October 2011 with a high-end black car
service called Uber Black.15 In June 2013, Uber introduced UberX in Boston, a more
affordable alternative that allowed drivers to use their own vehicles and soon outpaced
the luxurious Uber Black.16 UberX offers the same direct door-to-door convenience
as Uber Black but compensates for lower comfort with a price reduction from the
14. Based on Second Measure, a technology company that analyzes credit card transaction data,
Uber has lost some of its market share to Lyft in the past few yearsfrom 97 percent in July 2014
to 76 percent in July 2017, but maintains the largest market share. (Gessner 2019)
15. Based on Greenwood and Wattal (2017), the price premium over taxicabs is around 20 to 30
percent.
16. Uber Black accounts for 6 percent of Uber rides. (Bhuiyan, Johana 2017)
9taxi services. In August 2015, Uber launched its most affordable ride-sharing option
in Boston, Uber POOL. While it remains to be a door-to-door service, Uber POOL
aims to match riders with other parties going along a similar route. Uber POOL
can lead to a longer travel duration, however Uber claims that its pricing can be up
to 70 percent cheaper than a taxi in Boston. (Uber 2015a) Uber's competitor Lyft
launched a service parallel to Uber POOL, called Lyft Line, in October 2015.
With its discounted pricing, Uber POOL is the closest ride-sharing service to public
transportation. It is a particularly desirable option during times of excessive demand,
such as late at night on weekends, when Uber activates surge pricing to increase the
supply of drivers. Furthermore, it is difficult to hail a taxi near the closing time of
late night venues. In fact, the 2013 Taxi Consultant Report lists "unmet demand
during late night hours on weekends" as one of the most prominent issues of the
Boston taxi system. Only about 10 to 25 percent of taxi requests are met within
20 minutes on weekend nights between midnight and 1:00 a.m.; in stark contrast, on
weekday mornings between 8:00 and 11:00 a.m., 70 to 90 percent of taxi requests are
met within 20 minutes. (Nelson/Nygaard 2013) Due to price hikes and a shortage of
alternatives, Uber POOL is often the only affordable option. Uber highlights the de-
mand for its late night services on weekends in the following statement: "Each Friday
and Saturday between 10:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m., Uber facilitates nearly 70,000 trips
in Boston. In fact, when the T closes on weekend nights, Uber requests more than
double near popular stops like Park Street."17 (Zhou 2015) Moreover, Uber remarked
on the popularity of the new Uber POOL: "In just a few short months, Boston rid-
ers have already shared 200,000 rides with one anotherthat's over 11 (times) the
undergraduate student population at BU."18 (Zhou 2015) To summarize, evidence
suggests that Uber POOL is a popular and relatively affordable ride-sharing option
17. "T" refers to the MBTA subway system and Park Street is one of the centrally located MBTA
subway stops.
18. BU stands for the Boston University, which is located near downtown Boston.
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in Boston. Due to surge pricing and a shortage of other transportation options, it is
often the only feasible late night option on weekends for many Bostonians.
1.2.3 Nightlife & Liquor Laws in Boston
In a city that has had a demographic shift toward youth, why has Boston's late night
scene lagged?
- Bidgood (2016)
The LNS was recommended by the Late Night Task Force to encourage Boston's
lagging nightlife.19 The need for a special committee to support Boston's nightlife
appears to be a paradoxthe city seemingly fulfills all of the "prerequisites" for a
flourishing nightlife. With over fifty institutions of higher education in the area,
Boston is home to one of the largest student populations in the US. (Florida 2016)
The residents and visitors can choose between college bars, high-end bars, night clubs,
and the wildly popular Boston sports bars. However, Massachusetts has also been
selected as one of the worst states in America for drinking alcohol. Its strict rules
include a ban on happy hours, a ban on drinking games in bars, and exclusively
accepting in-state documentation as proof of age. (Matthews 2013) Importantly,
alcoholic beverages can be served until 2:00 a.m., which corresponds to the closing
time of the majority of bars and night clubs. The LNS extension of public transit to
2:30 a.m. thus allowed Bostonians to stay out until the 2:00 a.m. closing time and
still be able to travel home conveniently and affordably.
1.3 Mechanisms
In this section, I describe the channels through which the LNS may affect late night
crime. Since the impact is likely heterogeneous across crime types, aggregating inci-
19. The Late Night Task Force, appointed by Mayor of Boston, Martin J. Walsh, proposed several
nightlife-enhancing reforms, such as allowing some bars to stay open longer. The proposal did not
get approved at the state level. (Bidgood 2016)
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dents to one "all crime" variable would mask the inherent differences. Instead, I list
all of the individual crime outcomes and define two groups of crimes based on their
common characteristics. I discus the channels affecting each crime group separately
for each of the two periods of interest. In Period 1 (i.e. Phase I to Phase II in Figure
1·1), I focus on the channels through which the LNS launch affects crime outcomes.
In Period 2 (i.e. Phase III to Phase IV in Figure 1·1), I focus on the effect of LNS
termination on crime while considering the availability of Uber POOL.
1.3.1 Crime Outcomes
I select a set of offenses based on their prevalence in late night crime and general
frequency. The outcomes of interest are as follows: simple and aggravated assault,
robbery, residential and commercial burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny. To
split the crimes into groups, I considered two different approaches used by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. The Summary
Reporting System (SRS) contains eight crimes split between two groups.20 Violent
crimes include murder and non-negligent homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault, while property crimes include burglary, motor vehicle theft, larceny, and
arson. The National Incident-Based Reporting System categorizes a wider range of
crimes into three groups based on the object of the crime: crimes against person,
crimes against property, and crimes against society. Crimes against person include
all of the SRS's violent crimes except robbery, which is instead classified as a crime
against property. While robbery is motivated primarily by a financial gain, it also
involves the use of force. In this study, I place robbery in the violent crime group, as
I expect its prevalence to be determined mainly by the number of potential victims
and their level of intoxication, both of which are determining factors for violent crime.
That being said, I recognize that even within a crime group, each crime type may be
20. Only serious, regularly occurring crimes that are likely to be reported to police are included.
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an outcome of different contextual factors. For example, while assault is a dispute-
oriented act of violence, robbery represents a predatory act of violence, which involves
strangers. (Green et al. 2011) The late night environment is one in which dispute-
type violence may thrive and drive any effects I observe. In my analysis, I provide the
individual and group results in order to be transparent in terms of which outcomes
are affected by the LNS.21 Below is the list of crime types in each group:
1. Property crime (purpose of financial gain or other benefit): residential, com-
mercial, and other burglary, motor vehicle and other larceny, motor vehicle
theft
2. Violent crime (involves force or the threat of force): simple and aggravated
assault, robbery, harassment, homicide.
1.3.2 Mechanisms: Period 1
It the following paragraphs, I discuss the mechanisms that may drive the Period 1
results. I consider possible reasons why various crime types may be affected differently
by the LNS launch.
Violent Crime
The direct effect of extended MBTA operation is the addition of riders between 1:00
a.m. and 2:30 a.m. on Friday and Saturday nights. Before LNS, Bostonians had to
rely on other means of transportation after 1:00 a.m. For some, it is feasible to walk
home. The city of Boston is the third most walkable city in the US, which gives those
living in central neighborhoods the opportunity to get home by foot. (Hartnett 2015)
However, this option is obviously risky. The streets tend to be empty and dark late at
night, which puts pedestrians in a vulnerable position. From a criminal's perspective,
21. To keep the analysis concise, I include the individual crime results in the Appendix.
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though the emptiness implies fewer potential victims, the risk of being apprehended
is low.22
A desirable alternative to walking is a type of door-to-door car service. Some groups
of people include designated drivers. Some might take advantage of pricier op-
tionstaxi, limousine, UberX, or Uber Black. The risk associated with all of these
options is the time waiting for the car's arrival by the late night venue. As noted in
the ride-sharing background in Section 1.2.2, there is an excessive demand for taxis
on late weekend nights and, as a result, there are long delays and high prices. The
scarcity of door-to-door cars during the late night weekend hours leads to the crowd-
ing of areas around late night venues, prompting intoxicated parties to compete for
the next available taxi. Since violent crime tends to be motivated by spontaneous,
intense emotions and often involves alcohol consumption, the late night wait repre-
sents an environment prone to violent conflicts. (Zahnow 2018)
Depending on the outside option, public transportation may present a different set
of security risks. First, LNS riders need to walk to an MBTA stop close to the late
night venue. Environmental criminology literature views transportation stops as the
hot spots for crime. (Sherman et al. 1989; Kooi 2013; Hart and Miethe 2014) Areas
hosting MBTA stops close to late night venues become particularly susceptible to
crime for the same reasons as the waiting areas. Many of those leaving late night
venues are intoxicated, a factor correlated with the occurrence of violent crime.23 Af-
ter arriving at their MBTA stop, LNS riders still need to walk as the final part of
their trip. The surrounding area is likely to be rather empty in the early mornings.
22. Jacobs (1961) defines the concept of eyes on the street, which suggests that denser streets imply
the presence of more potential witnesses and ultimately entail a higher risk of being apprehended.
23. Alcohol consumption raises the likelihood of carrying out interpersonal crime by increasing
aggression, empowering emotional responses, and providing justification for immoral actions. Ex-
cessive alcohol consumption also makes an individual more vulnerable to various crimes. This is due
to the sedation effect and the dampening of cognitive functioning and motor skills. (Carpenter and
Dobkin 2010)
14
This means fewer potential victims and a lower likelihood of violent conflict, but for
criminals, the lower risk of getting apprehended due to less eyes on the street may
counteract those downsides. (Jacobs 1961)
The LNS transportation option involves segments during which the individuals are
surrounded by many people as well as segments during which they are likely to be
alone. Both environments are risky for different reasons. Criminology studies find the
relationship between street activity and exposure to violence to be nonlinear. At low
activity, an increase in the number of people is associated with an increase in violence,
which suggests that pedestrian traffic provides additional targets for criminals. Above
a certain activity threshold, further increases lead to a reduction of violence through
the informal monitoring of bystanders. (Browning and Jackson 2013) Browning et
al. (2010) find evidence of a curvilinear relationship between commercial/residential
density (which encourages steady streams of pedestrians) and aggravated assault and
homicide. Their results concerning robbery suggest a positive linear effect of larger
commercial/residential density, possibly because crowds allow criminals to quickly
disappear. Assaults, on the other hand, attract the attention of bystanders. Overall,
whether the direct effects of LNS are concentrated in the less or more densely popu-
lated areas is an empirical question that I asses in my main analysis.
The addition of an affordable transportation option may cause behavioral changes
throughout the night on weekends. First, LNS makes the choice of going out less
expensive. More people may decide to go out because of it. The compliers may have
preferences that are different than those who used to go out even before the LNS
launch. The mix of people in the bars and night clubs would then be affected as well.
For example, if the compliers do not consume as much alcohol as the always takers,
they may mitigate some of the expected increase in violent behavior related to alcohol
consumption in late night venues.
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Second, people may consider LNS when deciding when to go out. There may be a
substitution from week to weekend nights, since LNS makes weekend transportation
cheaper. People may also delay their departure to the late night venues. Previously,
in order to spend at least two hours out before catching the last train home, Bosto-
nians would have needed to leave home by 11:00 p.m. With the presence of LNS, the
required departure is delayed by at least an hour.
Importantly, the cost of staying at late night venues past 12:30 a.m. and continuing
to consume alcohol decreases. For those who preferred to stay out until closing time
but were not able to because of the binding MBTA schedule, LNS provided an op-
portunity to extend their stay until 2:00 a.m. Assuming that the extra time spent in
late night venues results in additional alcohol consumption, LNS increases the total
amount of alcohol consumed. Since alcohol is positively correlated with violent crime,
it remains to be an empirical question whether the potential positive effect of LNS on
transportation safety outweighs the negative effect of increased alcohol consumption.
Property Crime
While the LNS provides an affordable transportation option to potential victims, it
also improves the mobility of criminals. From a potential perpetrator's perspective,
LNS establishes low-cost, late night access to distant neighborhoods, increasing the
expected net payoff of a distant crime. Property crime may increase in the relatively
richer areas that were not easily accessible beforehand. Phillips and Sandler (2015)
show that perpetrators often travel to commit crimes and that the availability of
public transportation affects the occurrence of property crime. As reviewed in their
study, temporary rail station closures in Washington, DC led to a reduction in au-
tomobile theft in the vicinity of the stations. This reduction was not offset by any
crime increases in other areas. The authors utilize multiple irregular schedule changes
(such as weekend maintenance closures), while I focus on a long-term extension of
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public transportation during late night hours on weekends. Differences in the nature
of schedule changes may carry on to a variation in results between the two studies.
The increased street activity around the LNS-active MBTA stations may reduce prop-
erty crime through the eyes on the street effect. While property crime tends to be
premeditated, criminals can strategically choose not to commit a property crime (such
as motor vehicle theft) in the newly dense nightlife areas. (Zahnow 2018) Similar to
violent crimes, individual property crimes have unique features. For example, pick-
pocketing, which is an example of larceny, thrives in crowded areas. In dense spaces,
offenders can get close to their victims without causing any concern. (Gentry 2015)
These nuances are captured by the individual crime results.
1.3.3 Mechanisms: Period 2
I complement the discussion of Period 1 channels with a description of the potential
impacts of LNS termination on crime when Uber POOL is available.
First, however, I underline the importance of Uber POOL as a late night transporta-
tion alternative. Uber POOL essentially combines the benefits of public transporta-
tion and existing door-to-door services (mainly UberX and taxis). It represents a
close substitute to public transportation due to its relatively low price. Addition-
ally, Uber POOL offers a safe and comfortable way to get home after a night out.
Overall, the presence of Uber POOL as a mainstream alternative implies that the
termination of LNS does not necessarily lead to a reversion to the pre-LNS equilibria
in terms of "going out" patterns, transportation choices, and crime occurrence. For
these reasons, I treat Period 2 as an independent quasi-experiment.
Violent Crime
Upon the termination of LNS, a significant portion of former MBTA passengers is
likely to switch to Uber POOL, since it arguably represents a relatively close sub-
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stitute to LNS. Uber POOL leads to an increase in the supply of door-to-door car
services and can accommodate multiple parties, reducing the average wait time for
prospective passengers. Since the time spent waiting for rides in front of late night
venues is presumably one of the riskiest parts of a night out, the level of violent
crime should decrease. The newly closed MBTA stops no longer represent active hot
spots, since there is no reason for gathering around them. Therefore, less crime should
be occurring in the proximity of MBTA stops.
While Uber POOL is relatively affordable, it does represent an increase in the cost
of going out. Potentially, LNS termination could lead to a decrease in the number
of people who decide to go out. That being said, Uber POOL offers its clients more
flexibility and comfort than public transportation. The service allows people to return
home whenever they want. Their level of intoxication can be higher, since door-to-
door services require minimal effort. This factor may contribute to a moral hazard
with alcohol consumption, leading to more violent crime. It remains to be an empir-
ical questions whether the potential benefits of Uber POOL during late night hours
on weekends outweigh its costs. Additionally, we investigate whether the expected
shift of violent crime away from the MBTA stops will be compensated by an increase
in violent crime in other areas.
Property Crime
The termination of LNS reduces the mobility of criminals. It is unlikely that potential
offenders take advantage of Uber POOL, as the driver and co-riders would suspect
them or become potential witnesses. Since there are fewer people in the nightlife
areas, however, there may be more opportunities to commit a crime without being
seen. As noted above though, it is questionable whether the removal of a 60-minute
late night extension represents a significant enough change to alter criminal behavior.
Keeping these mechanisms in mind, I begin the following section with the description
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of my empirical analysis.
1.4 Ridership Impact Evaluation
In the first section of my empirical analysis, I evaluate the take-up of the LNS pro-
gram. I investigate if Bostonians took advantage of LNS and changed their late night
transportation choices. The findings in this section provide the foundation for my
main crime analysis in the following section. First, I describe the metric used as a
measure of ridership and the formation of the final ridership sample. Next, I explain
my empirical strategy and conduct a robustness check. I conclude the section by
discussing the findings and their implications for the main crime analysis.
1.4.1 MBTA Data Description
This study uses the publicly-available MBTA Gated Entries dataset, which spans a
period from September 2013 to December 2017. The measure used for MBTA rider-
ship is the number of entries at all gated MBTA stations. A unit of observation is
equal to the total number of successful card scans and ticket insertions recorded at
the gate of a given stop within a 15-minute period during a service day.24
This data does not represent the total number of passengers who travel through a
given stop, as it only includes those who enter the MBTA system at a given stop.
Since I am interested in capturing the activity occurring at and around the MBTA
stations (not inside of the trains and buses), the MBTA entries are the preferred met-
ric.25 I refer to the MBTA gated entries data as the "gated entries data" or "ridership
data" interchangeably throughout the rest of this study.
Ridership data is only available for gated MBTA stations, as the above-ground sta-
24. A service day is defined by the MBTA as the period from 3:00 a.m. one day to 2:59 a.m. the
following day.
25. Another useful metric for this study would be information on passenger exits. However, such
data is not available for Boston.
19
tions do not use the fare-gates that record passenger entry.26 While the gated-stop
entries might not capture a fully representative sample of total ridership, Figure 1·2
shows that Boston's nightlife areas are primarily located in the proximity of the gated
stations. While we expect the flow of people to move from these entertainment areas
during the late night hours, departures are captured by the gated stops' fare-gates.
The gated entries serve as a decent approximation of total ridership for weekend
nights.27
1.4.2 MBTA Data Cleaning
Before turning to ridership analysis, I discuss the method used to clean the MBTA
gated entries data. I remove holidays from the sample because the MBTA schedule,
as well as ridership patterns, differ substantially from those on standard days. I
also drop days on which total ridership is outside three standard deviations. These
outliers are typically caused by special circumstances, such as snowstorms or public
events.28 These events do not represent standard trends in ridership, nor do they
relate to the variation in transportation options that I aim to capture. Excluding
such extreme values from my dataset enables me to focus on the relevant, long-term
ridership trends.
Next, I need to deal with about 8 percent of the observations in the Stop*15minute
period panel, which are missing. Unfortunately, the staff of MBTA Dashboard is
not able to distinguish between the causes of missing data; absence may be due to
26. At the above-ground MBTA stations, passengers instead validate their payment using machines
located by the driver's cabin.
27. If the study was on, for example, morning commute ridership, the lack of above-ground fare-
gates would represent a serious issue. Commuters may depart from relatively remote areas, in which
the above-ground stops are common. For example, we cannot observe stop entries for those who live
in Brookline (a town neighboring Boston that is part of the Greater Boston area). These commuters
enter the MBTA subway system at one of the Brookline subway stops, which are exclusively above
the ground. The measure of ridership I use in this study would, therefore, underestimate the amount
of morning MBTA riders, which could lead to bias in the ridership trends.
28. For example, the number of gated entries at a centrally located MBTA subway stop Boylston
on November 2, 2013, was extremely high due to the World Series victory parade.
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technical issues, no riders entering an MBTA stop in a given 15-minute period, or the
closure of an MBTA stop. When the MBTA is not operating, passengers are not able
to enter gated MBTA stops. In those cases, I replace the missing observations with
zeros.29 This reduces the number of missing observations to 44,166, which constitutes
about 3.3 percent of the total sample.
The majority of missing values are present for the late night hours when the non-
missing ridership values tend to be small. Additionally, there are only about 200 zero
observations present in the entire original dataset. (See Figure A·1 in the Appendix).
Given these two facts, it makes sense to assume that the fare-gates mostly record
zero entries at night as missing values. However, missing values in the evening hours
might also be caused by technical issues. Imputing zeros globally could potentially
underestimate the true ridership trends, particularly in the evening. Therefore, in
my preferred strategy, I approximate the missing values with fitted values from the
following OLS regression, separately for each phase:
StationEntriesstation,date,quarter = α + β ∗ Station ∗DOW ∗Hour+
γ ∗Quarter ∗ CalendarDate+ station,date,quarter. (1.1)
With this specification, I estimate the ridership at a given station during a 15-
minute period on a given calendar day by taking into account ridership at the station
on a given day of the week during a given hour (Station ∗ DOW ∗ Hour), as well
as the overall ridership level on a given calendar day during a 15-minute period
(Quarter ∗ CalendarDate).
29. These cases include the following days and times: weekdays after 1:00 a.m. in all four phases,
weekends after 1:00 a.m. in Phases I and IV, after 2:30 a.m. in Phase I, and after 2:00 a.m. during
Phase III.
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1.4.3 Empirical Method
I divide my ridership sample into two periods based on the availability of Uber POOL
and analyze each period separately. In Period 1, I evaluate the effect of the LNS launch
when the Uber POOL alternative is not available (i.e. Phase I to Phase II in Figure
1·1). In Period 2, I consider the impact of terminating LNS when the ride-sharing
alternative is available (i.e. Phase III to Phase IV in Figure 1·1).
I aggregate the ridership data to the time of the day level. The sample consists of
weekend evenings (8:0011:30 p.m.) and late nights (12:303:00 a.m.). I implement
a difference-in-difference strategy. The weekend late nights are directly affected by
LNS and therefore represent the treated group. The weekend evenings serve as the
control group. The following are the main empirical specifications for Period 1 and
Period 2, respectively:
Entriesday,tod = α + β ∗ ToD ∗ LNSlaunch+ δdow∗tod + λmonth + day,tod , (1.2)
Entriesday,tod = α+ β ∗ ToD ∗LNStermination+ δdow∗tod + λmonth + day,tod , (1.3)
where the dependent variable Entriesday,tod stands for the total MBTA gated entries
on a calendar date (day) during a time of the day (ToD). In Period 1, LNSlaunch is a
dummy variable equal to one when LNS is active. In Period 2, I use a dummy variable
called LNStermination that is equal to one after LNS is terminated. DoW*ToD
represents a fixed effect controlling for the levels of crime on Friday and Saturday
evenings and late nights. I control for calendar month to capture any seasonal effects.
The coefficient of interest β measures effect of the interaction term LNS* ToD, which
is equal to one on weekend late nights while LNS is active.
Table 1.1 summarizes the weekend ridership data by the transportation phase and
time of day. The average evening ridership fluctuates above 50,000 in Phases I and
II and decreases to 44,900 and 42,400 in Phases III and IV, respectively. Since Uber
22
POOL was introduced at the beginning of Phase III, the decline in average ridership
is plausibly caused by a portion of the MBTA riders switching to the new ride-sharing
service. Late night MBTA ridership is only a fraction of the evening averages. In
Phases I and IV, when the MBTA closes at 1:00 a.m., the averages capture ridership in
the last half-hour of service (0:30 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.). The number of riders increases
dramatically after the launch of LNS. In Phase III, the average declines to 5,000
riders, likely due to the introduction of Uber POOL and cutback of LNS to 2:00 a.m.
The identifying assumption for the difference-in-difference strategy is that evening
and late night ridership would exhibit parallel trends in the absence of LNS. I provide
evidence suggesting that the requirement is fulfilled by plotting the average monthly
ridership trends by day of the week and time of the day. Figure 1·3 includes weekends
as well as Thursdays for reference. The vertical black lines signal the LNS launch,
Uber POOL introduction, and LNS termination. Although captured over a short
period, the pre-trends in evening and night ridership appear to be parallel. Evening
ridership on Thursdays and weekends tends to follow similar seasonal trends, and
does not demonstrate any trend breaks that would stand out and cause concern. The
Thursday late night ridership stays around 1,000 riders throughout the entire period of
interest. The weekend late night ridership fluctuates between 1,000 and 2,000 riders
when LNS is not active, though it rises to 9,000 riders with LNS active. Overall,
evening ridership does not reveal any unrelated changes besides seasonal fluctuations,
and ridership on weekend nights clearly responds to the presence of LNS.
1.4.4 Results
Table 1.2 presents the results of my regression analysis. The Period 1 coefficient of
interest β confirms that late night ridership increases significantly in Phase II when
LNS extended weekend service to 2:30 a.m. Average ridership per night increased by
about 6,500 passengers; that constitutes an increase of about 370 percent, since the
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pre-LNS average was 1,758 riders.
The Period 2 coefficient on After LNS x Late Night captures the decrease in ridership
on weekend late nights due to the LNS termination. Since MBTA service was cut
back to the 1:00 a.m. closing time, forcing Bostonians to rely on Uber POOL or other
more expensive car services. 30
1.4.5 Robustness Check
The weekend evening group works particularly well as a control group for the crime
analysis because the occurrence of crime between 8:00 and 11:30 p.m. on weekends is
sufficient and related to nightlife. However, my empirical method would be problem-
atic, if LNS also affects weekend evening ridership. In this section, I test the validity
of my preferred control group using an alternative approach.
While I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy, for this test I use Thursday rider-
ship as my control group for weekend ridership. Thursday is considered to be the
weeknight that most closely emulates the nightlife atmosphere of a weekend night.
Since universities often hold fewer classes on Fridays, Thursday nights have become
popular nights out for college students. (Hafner 2005) Weekend and Thursday rider-
ship trends, portrayed in Figure 1·3, tend to be relatively aligned (except during the
time frames covered by LNS weekend service, of course). This supports the suitability
of Thursday as a ridership control group. First, I conduct the analysis on an hourly
level. Aside from ensuring the quality of my preferred control group, the findings
verify the choice of the late night weekend hours that I consider to be LNS-treated
in the main portion of the empirical exercise.
The results in Table 1.3 confirm that weekend evening ridership does not see any sig-
nificant changes compared to Thursday following the introduction of LNS. For that
30. The ridership results hold even when I perform the analysis with an alternative ridership sample
in which all missing ridership values are substituted with zeros.
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reason, I am comfortable sticking with my original choice for the control group. I
repeat the same analysis on a more detailed 30-minute level and clarify that the di-
rect LNS effect is seen in the large relative increase in ridership between 12:30 and
3:00 a.m. (Table A.1 in the Appendix). I also find an evidence of behavioral changes
stemming from LNS. Particularly, I observe a decline in ridership between 11:30 p.m.
and 12:30 a.m. as a result of the LNS introduction. While this time period is not
binding in terms of the availability of public transportation in Phase I, the decline
in ridership suggests that people stay longer in the late night venues when the con-
venient and affordable LNS emerges. I exclude this time period from the rest of the
analysis because it is not long enough to provide the power necessary for the crime
analysis. In the rest of this study, my comparison focuses on just the evening and
late night weekend hours.
To summarize the findings of the ridership analysis, I find that LNS affected the
nightlife in Boston by extending MBTA's operation past the typical closing time of
late night venues. I provide evidence of both direct and behavioral effects. Further-
more, I infer that Uber POOL is an important transportation alternative that people
use as a substitute for public transportation, especially during the late night weekend
hours. In the following section, I analyze the main research interest of this study: the
impact of late night transportation options on crime in Boston.
1.5 Crime Impact Evaluation
In the main empirical section, I begin by describing the crime dataset. I further
discuss my empirical strategy and present a set of results. Initial findings detail
the impact of LNS on rates of late night crime in aggregate terms. From there, I
utilize the geocoded crime data and analyze how LNS affected spatial crime patterns.
I conclude the empirical analysis in Section 1.6 by conducting multiple robustness
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checks to verify the consistency of my findings.
1.5.1 Crime Data Description
The Boston Police Department (BPD) provides the dataset of reported crime on the
city's open data hub, Analyze Boston. The data includes initial details of the inci-
dents that BPD officers respond to. Importantly, the variables include the incident's
classification, earliest possible date and time of occurrence, and geocoded location
(obscured to the street segment centroid for privacy).
BPD modified its legacy crime incident reporting system to the new system in June
2015. While crime reports changed slightly with the new system, I was able to man-
ually match most of the frequently occurring and relevant crime types. Furthermore,
the two datasets are used separately, since the end of the legacy reporting system
conveniently lines up with the end of Phase II. This aspect guarantees consistency
within each part of the analysis.
Finally, most studies using police crime reports face a common issue: not all crime is
reported to the police. For a variety of reasons, victims may not decide to report the
incidents they were involved in. This results in crime levels being underestimated.
My analysis should not be affected by this limitation so long as the rate of reporting
in the evening and late night does not change over time. Theoretically, LNS could
have prompted the police to allocate more resources to MBTA stops, which would
lead to a higher rate of reporting. However, an increase in police presence would also
act as a deterrent to crime. The existing literature on policing and crime documents
a negative relationship between police per capita and crime. (Draca, Machin, and
Witt 2011; Klick and Tabarrok 2005; Tella and Schargrodsky 2004) Such bias would,
in fact, understate the true effects of my findings on violent crime. Moreover, the
empirical evidence suggests that the effect of police activity on violent crime tends to
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be smaller and less robust than the effect on property crime.31 Having discussed the
data and crime reporting caveats, the next section describes the empirical method.
1.5.2 Empirical Method
The empirical strategy is analogical to the ridership analysis. I utilize a difference-in-
difference technique to evaluate the impact of LNS on crime outcomes. As was the
case in the previous section, I split my sample into Periods 1 and 2 and analyze each
period separately.
The weekend evening hours (8:0011:15 p.m.) that are unaffected by the LNS serve
as the control group for both periods.32 The treated group is composed of late night
weekend hours, during which the MBTA ridership rises as a result of LNS activity.
Also, I consider the 30-minute reduction in LNS starting at the end of June 2015. In
Period 1, the treated group includes crime incidents that occur between 12:15 and
3:00 a.m. (up to 30 minutes after the last trains depart to account for the travel time
after boarding).33 In order to reflect the change in LNS closure time in Period 2, I
shorten the treated group by 30 minutes (12:152:30 a.m.).
My main specifications for Period 1 and Period 2, respectively, are represented by the
following equations:
Crimeday,tod = α + β ∗ ToD ∗ LNSlaunch+ δdow∗tod + λmonth + day,tod , (1.4)
Crimeday,tod = α + β ∗ ToD ∗ LNStermination+ δdow∗tod + λmonth + day,tod , (1.5)
31. Violent crime is typically not premeditated and lacks the strategy component. Offenders may
not consider the expected payoff. Therefore, the deterrence and increased reporting effects may
counteract each other. (Vollaard and Hamed 2012)
32. While the decrease in ridership does not occur until 11:30 p.m., it is preceded by the departure
from late night venues themselves. Hence, I bring forward the end of the control period by 15
minutes, to 11:15 p.m., in order to exclude the reduction in the movement of individuals from the
late night venues to the MBTA stops.
33. Using the same reasoning from earlier, I bring forward the beginning of the treated time period
by 15 minutes, to 12:15 a.m., this time to capture the movement of individuals from the late night
venues to the MBTA stops.
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where Crimeday,tod represents the number of crimes on a given calendar date (day)
and a time of the day (tod). The two times of the day included are evening and
late night and the analysis is limited to Fridays and Saturdays. The hours between
midnight and 3:00 a.m. belong to the previous calendar day because they relate to its
night out. In Period 1, LNSlaunch is a dummy variable equal to one when the LNS
launches in Boston. In Period 2, I use a dummy variable called LNStermination,
which is equal to one after the LNS termination. I include day of the week*time of
the day fixed effects to capture any time-invariant crime level differences on Friday
and Saturday evenings and nights. In order to control for crime seasonality, I also
use the calendar month fixed effect. In addition to the OLS model, I estimate the
coefficients using a Poisson regression, which is used to model count data such as the
relatively infrequent crime incidents.
In a related study, Jackson and Owens (2011) use Thursday as an additional control
group, which is not optimal in my setting. First, I use a more precise treatment win-
dow defined by ridership data, and Thursday nights do not have a sufficient number
of incidents in the equivalent time frames. Second, crime dynamics in Boston are
generally different on weekdays than on weekends. Since the identifying assumption
of the statistical model is that the treated and control groups would follow the same
crime trends without LNS, including Thursday could cause issues for the empirical
strategy if variables unrelated to LNS shift the weekday crime rates.
In the following sections, I provide the summary statistics and results for each part
of the crime analysis. I focus on the crime group outcomes in the main study and
present the corresponding individual crime tables in the Appendix.34 First, I evaluate
the effect of LNS on the aggregate level of crime in the entire city of Boston. Second,
34. Individual crime types are often not sufficiently represented in the final dataset to lead to
reliable estimates. Given the fact that I am testing multiple hypotheses, the requirement for the
significance of each individual coefficient is stricter. For example, using the conservative Bonferroni
correction, the p-value cut-off is 0.005 (α/n = 0.05/10).
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I investigate the effect of LNS on the spatial distribution of crime by splitting Boston
based on distance from MBTA stops and late night venues. Finally, I conduct a
horse-race regression to determine which hot spots contribute the most to my results.
1.5.3 Aggregate Level of Crime in Boston
Summary Statistics
Table 1.4 provides summary statistics of the crime groups. It exposes differential
time of the day patterns in the two groups. While violent crime occurs with a similar
frequency both at night and in the evening, the number of property crimes clearly
peaks in the evening hours. The average property crime rate stays above six incidents
per weekend evening through all four phases, while the average violent crime rate
fluctuates between 4.9 and 5.3 incidents per evening. At night, the average rate of
property crime decreases toward 1.8 to 3.8 incidents per night, that is, below the
average late night violent crime rate. The occurrence of violent crime decreases from
Phase II to Phase III, a concern for the analysis of Period 2. Potential explanations
for the drop in violent crime include the change in the crime data reporting system
and the introduction of Uber POOL. In order to make sure that I am not capturing a
declining trend in violent crime unrelated to LNS, I conduct a placebo test in Section
1.6. The most frequently occurring crimes are assaults and larcenies (Appendix Table
A.4).
Results
The first set of results shows the impact of LNS on the aggregate level of crime in the
city of Boston.35 Columns (1) to (4) of Table 1.5 do not reveal any strong, significant
impacts of the LNS launch on the aggregate levels of either crime group. In contrast,
35. The harassment outcome is only present with sufficient frequency in Period 2's dataset, there-
fore I do not include it in the Period 1 analysis as an individual outcome.
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the Period 2 results in columns (7) and (8) provide evidence of a statistically signif-
icant reduction in late night violent crime as a result of the LNS termination. The
OLS coefficient in column (7) suggests a decline of 1.93 violent crimes each late night
on weekends. Given the pre-treatment average of 4.32, this represents a 45 percent
decline in the outcome. The Poisson coefficient in column (8) is aligned with the OLS
magnitude, as −0.4625 corresponds to a 37 percent (e−0.4625 − 1) decrease in violent
crime. The effect of the LNS termination on property crime is also negative, though
it is only significant when estimated with Poisson at the 5 percent confidence level.
The discrepancy in the magnitudes and significance of the coefficients in columns (5)
and (6) arises implicitly from the difference in the assumed counterfactuals and is
driven primarily by residential burglary. The absolute decrease in the evening and
late night property crimes measured by OLS is similar, therefore their difference is
small and insignificant. On the other hand, the percentage reduction in property
crime measured by Poisson is larger during the late night hours than in the evening,
which results in a larger and more significant coefficient.36 I am not able to draw
conclusions about which method gives the most accurate result. However, the impact
of LNS termination on property crime does not prove to be particularly salient in the
following exercise.
In order to interpret the results, it is essential to explore the spatial variation of the
effect that LNS had on crime in Boston. I need to confirm that the insignificant
aggregate results found in Period 1 do not hide, for example, a decrease in crime
in the nightlife areas offset by an increase in residential neighborhoods. Similarly,
in order to interpret the favorable effects of LNS termination, we need to determine
what Boston's areas are contributing to the negative coefficients.
36. Violent crime results do not encounter a similar issue as their average occurrence is similar in
the evening and late at night.
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1.5.4 Crime in Boston by Distance from Hot Spots
As described in Section 1.3, the two sets of hot spots that are likely to be affected
by the LNS program are the areas close to MBTA stops and late night venues. In
the following two subsections, I investigate the heterogeneous effects of LNS on crime
outcomes based on distance from MBTA stops and late night venues, respectively. I
summarize and discuss the results of the two spatial analyses jointly.
Distance from LNS Bus and Subway Stops: Data Description
I take advantage of the geographic coordinates to calculate the distance from the
nearest MBTA stop of each crime incident.37 I group the incidents into three cate-
gories: 0200m, 200500m, and above 500m. I omit airport stops and those that are
closed due to construction for a substantial amount of time. In Period 2, I do not
account for the stops along bus lines that were eliminated from LNS at the end of
June 2015. Figure 1·4 depicts the map of Boston split into the three distance from
a stop categories. The black dots indicate the locations of the MBTA bus stops that
are eliminated at the end of Period 1. The central neighborhoods of Boston in the
northern part of the map have dense MBTA coverage, leaving no space for the above
500m category. The more remote areas in the southern part of Boston have fairly
sparse MBTA coverage. The MBTA lines are spaced in fairly regular intervals, but
bus stops in remote areas tend to be closer to each other than subway stops.
Distance from Late night Venues: Data Description
For this section, I obtained a dataset of alcohol licenses issued by the City of Boston
Licensing Board.38 The licenses are broken down into categories based on the types
of alcohol that can be sold at the venue (wine and malt beverages or all alcoholic
37. I include MBTA stops that are active during LNS and are situated within Boston or at most
150m from its border.
38. The dataset is publicly available on the Analyze Boston website.
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beverages), the type of establishment (restaurants, clubs, hotels, taverns, and general
on-premises establishments), closing time, and other features.39 In order to create a
sample of establishments representative of nightlife activity, I address two data issues.
First, more than a third of the observations do not include geographic coordinates.
I use other available information (name of the venue and its address) to input the
coordinate values using Google Maps. I manually check the accuracy of results to
see whether the address of each venue assigned by Google Maps corresponds to the
address provided in the original dataset. I am able to match the vast majority of the
venues with their location.
Second, with regard to the true nightlife venues, the categories in the liquor license
data do not capture any nuance, such as hotels that include a night club. It would
also be incorrect to include all hotels in my final dataset, as some of them only offer
low-key bars for their guests. Instead of relying on the original establishment type, I
use the Google Maps keyword characterization of the venues.40 I select observations
that include the keywords "bar" or "night club." I further restrict the sample to the
venues that are allowed to serve all alcoholic beverages and are open until at least
1:00 a.m.
The final dataset includes almost 400 venues. Most of them are best described as
bars, and almost two-thirds of them stay open for as long as they are able to serve
alcohol.41 Figure 1·5 shows that the density of late night venues across the census
block groups is not evenly distributed. In fact, bars and night clubs are concentrated
in a few central areas: Downtown, South Boston, and around Fenway (the darkest
shaded areas on the map).
39. Clubs refer to associations of people such as sports clubs or veteran clubs.
40. For example, a well-known concert venue House of Blues is coded as "bar, establishment, food,
night club, point of interest, restaurant, store."
41. 327 venues can be characterized as bars, 52 include both "bar" and "night club" keywords, and
the remaining 5 are night clubs. 241 venues are open until 2:00 a.m. and the remaining 143 close at
1:00 a.m.
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Analogically to calculating the distances from MBTA stops in the previous section, I
obtain the distance from the nearest late night venue for each crime incident. Figure
1·6 shows a map of Boston split into the three distance from a late night venue
categories: 0200m, 200500m, and above 500m. Overall, there is some overlap
between the late night venue and MBTA stop distance groups. However, a large
portion of central Boston is part of the 0200m late night venue group, as many bars
and night clubs are situated in the relatively small area. Also, while MBTA stops are
spread out at similar distances, late night venues tend to be scattered (especially in
more remote neighborhoods). Sectioning the crime incidents by their distance from
the late night venues, therefore, captures a new subset of the Boston area and can
help us understand the mechanisms through which crime is affected by LNS.
Results
In this section, I discuss the results of both hot spot analyses in Tables 1.6 and 1.7.42
The two sets of results complement each other and the spatial nature of the analyses
allows me to determine the channels that predominantly contribute to the findings.
To be concise, I show the OLS results in the main part of the chapter but show the
equivalent Poisson estimation results, which are mostly consistent with the OLS es-
timation, in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
The effect of LNS on property crime does not vary in relation to distance from hot
spots. In most cases, it is insignificant.43 In Section 1.3, I described a set of chan-
nels through which property crime could be affected by LNS. That being said, the
relatively short late night extension may not present a sufficient enough incentive
to alter behavior related to property crime. It is challenging to envision criminals
42. Tables A.7, A.8, A.9, A.10, A.11, A.12, A.13, and A.14 in the Appendix show the individual
crime results.
43. Some of the Period 2 coefficients are weakly significant when estimated with Poisson due to
the reasons that I discuss in Section 1.5.3.
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transporting stolen items via subway or bus because the MBTA happens to run for
90 more minutes at night on the weekends. I consider auto theft to be a property
crime that is most likely to be affected in my setting, which is also consistent with
the results of Phillips and Sandler (2015). However, the frequency of auto theft is
not sufficient during the limited weekend late night hours to provide me with robust
regression results.
Violent crime is likely to respond to changes in the MBTA schedule since the popula-
tion affected by the LNS program carries its risk factors (primarily alcohol intoxica-
tion). Therefore, any changes to the late night variables affecting population behavior
could potentially shift the violent crime equilibrium. Somewhat surprisingly, Period
1 effects of the LNS launch tend to be too noisy to interpret. The MBTA hot spot
results are suggestive of crime redistribution from the close proximity of MBTA stops
to the more remote areas, but the coefficients are not robust.44 The inconclusive
findings on violent crime suggest that the opposing channels induced by the LNS
launch may offset each other. More time spent in late night venues leads to more
alcohol consumption, which in turn generates more conflict. At the same time, there
are fewer people to get into a conflict with. The crowd of people waiting for (and
fighting over) a taxi or UberX at the end of the night becomes smaller as some walk
to MBTA stops instead.
Period 2 results provide strong evidence that the reduction in aggregate violent crime
in Boston is driven by the areas close to MBTA stops and late night venues. Not
only are the coefficients for the more distant categories insignificant, but they are
also smaller in magnitude. Together, the results provide cohesive evidence that the
LNS termination led to a reduction of violent crime in the nightlife areas and the
44. I further elaborated on these findings by separating the Boston area by its ethnic composition. If
LNS uptake is different across ethnic groups, the effects may be heterogeneous across neighborhoods
as well as MBTA stop distance. The results from this additional exercise remained too noisy and
lacked power.
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areas surrounding MBTA stops. The MBTA stops no longer act as the hot spots, and
the lack of the late night passenger crowd reduces the probability of violent crime
in their proximity. The negative effect of LNS termination on violent crime close to
late night venues shows that the risk of violent conflict is concentrated around the
time spent waiting for a ride or walking to the MBTA stops. The availability of Uber
POOL allows people to depart quickly from nightlife areas, which I consider to be
the key to violent crime reduction. Furthermore, the reduction in violent crime is
not compensated by increases in other areas. The strongest individual crime result is
the effect on simple assault, which is precisely the type of crime we would expect in
relation to nightlife conflicts.
1.5.5 Horse-Race Between Stops and Liquor Venues
In the final section of the main empirical analysis, I investigate whether it is proximity
to MBTA stops or late night venues that primarily drives the Period 2 violent crime
reduction. I focus on this particular combination of the outcome and period, as it is
the one I consistently find impacted by LNS. I create three crime subsets based on the
relative location of each incident. The first group includes crimes that occur in close
proximity to both MBTA stops and late night venues. The second and third crime
groups occur near one of the hot stops while the other type of hot spot is at least
500m away.45 In the following empirical model, I only use the three groups defined
45. The exact criteria for the three groups in the 0200m category are the following: 1) Bars and
MTBA stops group: 0200m from an MBTA stop and within 500m from a late night liquor venue,
or vice versa, 2) Bars group: 0200m from a late night liquor venue and more than 500m away
from an MBTA stop, and 3) MBTA stops group: 0200m from an MBTA stop and more than 500m
away from a late night venue. The criteria for the three groups in the 200500m category are the
following: 1) Bars and stops group: 200500m from an MBTA stop and a late night venue, 2) Bars
group: 200500m from a late night venue and more than 500m away from an MBTA stop, and 3)
MBTA stops group: 200-500m from an MBTA stop and more than500m away from a late night
venue.
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above:
V iolentCrimeg,day,tod = α + β ∗ ToD ∗ LNStermination ∗Group+
γ ∗Group+ δdow∗tod + λmonth + g,day,tod , (1.6)
where V iolentCrimeg,day,tod represents the number of violent crimes for a group
(g) on a given day (day) and at a given time of day (tod). Variable Group marks
the group each observation belongs to and is added to the set of interactions. I
use a dummy variable called LNStermination, which is equal to one after the LNS
termination. In the analysis, I define the days and times of the day analogically to the
main specification (Equation (1.5)) and also use the same fixed effects. The caveat of
the method is the low occurrence of violent crime in the latter two groups, since they
both include fairly remote Boston areas. The first group, on the other hand, covers
the central areas of Boston and therefore has a high frequency of late night crime.
Table 1.8 shows the results of the horse-race regressions. Violent crime located within
200m from the hot spots decreases significantly in the areas that are close to both bars
and MBTA stops. While all groups share negative coefficients, they are also noisy in
the case of the latter two groups. Similarly, most of the coefficients remain negative
in the 200500m distant category, though all results are insignificant. Overall, the
horse-race analysis supports the hypothesis that LNS termination reduces violent
crime in the areas that are close to both late night venues and MBTA stops.
1.6 Robustness Check
1.6.1 Missing Crime Location
In this part of the study, I address an issue with the crime dataset: the absence
of location information in a subset of crime incidents. The crime incidents with no
listed location account for about 5.8 percent of the total crime sample and are not
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constrained to a particular crime type.46 While I drop these observations in my main
analysis, I must verify that the results are not driven by this choice. We are only
concerned about dropping these observations if their proportion is correlated with
the LNS treatment in a given period. Figure 1·7 plots total monthly crime on week-
end evenings and late nights, distinguishing between observations with and without
location availability. The percentage of crimes without location is visibly larger in
the second dataset.47 Since Period 2 is completely separated from Period 1's quasi-
experiment, the difference in level of crimes with no listed location does not cause an
issue for the analysis. Figure 1·7 also shows that Period 1 includes a relatively large
proportion of crimes with no listed location in the first half of 2015.
Keeping in mind these data concerns, I repeat the analysis with two variations. First,
I add the observations with no listed location to my sample. Table 1.9 shows that
both the magnitude and significance of the estimates stay consistent with the main
findings when the additional observations are included.
Second, I restrict the Period 1 sample to the months that had a relatively low pro-
portion of crimes with no listed location. In other words, I exclude incidents that
occurred in the first half of 2015. The results in Table 1.10 are consistent with the
main Period 1 estimates. Overall, this robustness exercise addressing the absence of
listed crime locations suggests that my results are valid and that the dataset is not
biased due to their exclusion in the main analysis.
1.6.2 Placebo LNS
I conduct two placebo tests to ensure that my findings are not driven by the chosen
research design or unobserved factors. If the placebo exercise delivered significant
effects of placebo LNS on crime, it would indicate that the main findings may be
46. 33,833 out of 580,431 crime incidents
47. As explained in Section 1.5.1, the BPD modified its reporting system in June 2015. Crime
reported under the new system is included in a separate dataset.
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capturing ongoing trends in crime that are unrelated to LNS itself. First, I restrict
the data to August 2012March 2014, that is, to the time period before LNS launched.
I set the placebo LNS launch on June 1, 2013, which is approximately the middle of
this period. Columns (1) to (4) in Table 1.11 show the crime group results, which are
all insignificant.
Second, I limit my data to an extended post-period: April 2016August 2018. I set
the placebo LNS termination in the middle of this period, on June 1, 2017. As with
the Period 1 placebo results, columns (5) to (8) in Table 1.11 show that the placebo
LNS termination had no significant impact on the crime group outcomes. Overall,
the fact that the placebo regressions do not show an effect on crime is comforting. I
am only able to find an effect when using the actual LNS dates, which suggests that
I am indeed capturing the impact that LNS had on crime.
1.7 Conclusion
The demand for off-peak and weekend public transit has been surging in recent years,
so much so that William M. Wheeler, the director of planning at New York City's
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, compared the explosion in weekend subway
ridership to the past, when people used to work six days a week. (Grynbaum 2011)
This trend is likely a result of the changes in urban living.48 In this study, I focused
on the often-cited factor: the growing importance of the late night economy. As the
late night economy expands, residents and tourists demand greater accessibility to
the nightlife areas.
How can cities balance the demands of its residents when it comes to the late night
economy? Public provision of late night transportation boosts nightlife activity, in
48. More urban households tend to live without a car and rely on alternative modes of transporta-
tion. The rise of the service sector requires many, particularly minority and low-income workers, to
commute to work during weekends and late nights. Additionally, changing technology has altered
the work schedule from the typical "nine to five" to nonstandard times. (Jaffe 2014)
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turn bringing revenues and jobs to the city. On the other hand, concerns over the
spread of crime due to such public service resonate in some neighborhoods. (Graves
2018; Snyder 2017) My study analyzed the impact of both the launch and termination
of Boston's Late night Service, a weekend late night public transportation extension
that operated in the city between March 2014 and March 2016. Specifically, I inves-
tigated the effect of late night transportation options on crime in this urban setting.
The findings of the study are relevant to the local policy makers who prepare trans-
portation programs as well as to officials in the Boston Police Department who may
consider the insights of the study when determining officer allocation based on MBTA
schedule changes.
I found that LNS significantly increased ridership during the hours of its operation
and made people change their behavior due to the lower cost of staying out later.
Results indicated that the impact of LNS on crime is dependent on the availability of
alternative late night transportation options. I did not find conclusive results when
evaluating the LNS introduction's impact on crime. I believe this is due to the can-
celing out of opposing channelson one side, a relatively safe LNS, on the other,
an increase in alcohol consumption. I found a significant decrease in violent crime
as a result of the LNS termination. This effect is driven by the nightlife areas close
to MBTA stops and late night venues. These effects can be explained by the shift
from LNS to Uber POOLa ride-sharing service and a relatively close substitute for
LNSavailable during the examined period.
The results reveal a non-trivial benefit of the fast-growing ride-sharing industry when
it comes to the late night economy. However, the study is not able to speak to other
potential effects, such as the effects of ride-sharing on traffic congestion or socioeco-
nomic inequality. Further research on the subject is necessary to collect comprehen-
sive information on the emerging "Uber economy" and to provide policymakers with
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recommendations on how to effectively regulate it.
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1: Weekend Ridership Summary by Transporta-
tion Phase
Weekend Evening Ridership (8:0011:30 p.m.)
Mean Std. Dev.
Phase I 50818 7644
Phase II 50265 8520
Phase III 44883 7826
Phase IV 42447 7386
Weekend Late Night Ridership (12:303:00 a.m.)
Mean Std. Dev.
Phase I 1758 403
Phase II 7609 1701
Phase III 5193 1251
Phase IV 1303 310
Note: This table shows ridership summary statistics for Friday
and Saturday evenings (8:0011:30 p.m.) and nights (12:303:00
a.m.). Phase I is a period pre-LNS and pre-Uber POOL. Phase
II starts with the LNS launch in March 2014 and ends with the
Uber POOL arrival to Boston in August 2015. Phase III spans
the months, in which both LNS and Uber POOL are available.
Finally, in Phase IV, only Uber POOL remains active as LNS
is terminated. The phases' characteristics are visualized in Fig-
ure 1·1. Holidays are excluded from the sample. I also drop
days with extreme ridership values after controlling for day of
the week and transportation phase. Missing observations are
replaced by fitted ridership values as described in Section 1.4.
The 20132017 Gated Station Entries datasets used for the rid-
ership analysis are publicly available on the MBTA Performance
Dashboard website.
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Table 1.2: The Effect of LNS on Late Night Ridership Using Evening Hours as the
Control Group
Period 1: LNS Launch Period 2: LNS Termination
Late Night Ridership Late Night Ridership
12:30 - 3 am 12:30 - 3 am
LNS Launch x Late Night 6512∗∗∗
(994)
LNS Term. x Late Night -1757∗∗
(774)
Saturday -9820∗∗∗ -9318∗∗∗
(637) (481)
Late Night -54253∗∗∗ -44232∗∗∗
(961) (745)
Saturday Late Night 10016∗∗∗ 9265∗∗∗
(899) (678)
Observations 378 394
Mean DV 28172 22752
Month FE Yes Yes
Note: This tables includes results of difference-in-difference regressions. Late
weekend nights (12:303:00 a.m.) represent the treated group and weekend
evenings (8:0011:30 p.m.) serve as the control group. In all regressions, I control
for month and day of the week fixed effects. Missing observations are replaced
by fitted ridership values as described in Section 1.4. The 20132017 Gated Sta-
tion Entries datasets used for the ridership analysis are publicly available on the
MBTA Performance Dashboard website.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the
10% level.
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Table 1.3: The Effect of LNS on Hourly Ridership Using Thursday as the Control Group
Period 1: LNS Launch
8-9pm 9-10pm 10-11pm 11pm-12am 12-1am 1-2am 2-3am
LNS Launch x Weekend -762∗ -260 -702 -836∗∗ 6 3304∗∗∗ 1567∗∗∗
Weekend (452) (450) (425) (345) (185) (147) (95)
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
Mean DV 16192 15073 13624 9865 4877 1912 772
DoW FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cal. Week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period 2: LNS Termination
8-9pm 9-10pm 10-11pm 11pm-12am 12-1am 1-2am 2-3am
LNS Term. x Weekend -462 -443 -511 -288 -982∗∗∗ -2472∗∗∗ -545∗∗∗
(375) (375) (393) (260) (115) (73) (16)
Observations 347 347 347 347 347 347 347
Mean DV 14511 13188 11796 8138 3487 700 108
DoW FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cal. Week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table includes results of the hourly difference-in-difference regressions. Weekend ridership represents
the treated group and Thursday ridership serves as the control group. In all regressions, I use the calendar
week fixed effect. Holidays are excluded from the sample. I also drop days with extreme ridership values after
controlling for day of the week and transportation phase. Missing observations are replaced by fitted ridership
values as described in Section 1.4. The 20132017 Gated Station Entries datasets used for the ridership analysis
are publicly available on the MBTA Performance Dashboard website.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics: The Average of Crime Group
Outcomes in Boston: Weekend Evening and Late Night
Property Crime
Night Evening Difference N(Night) N(Evening)
Phase I 3.81 8.49 4.69*** 124 124
(2.23) (3.31) (0.36)
Phase II 3.36 7.61 4.25*** 116 116
(1.98) (3.13) (0.34)
Phase III 2.58 6.93 4.36*** 59 59
(1.60) (2.86) (0.43)
Phase IV 1.80 6.45 4.65*** 172 172
(1.58) (2.82) (0.25)
Violent Crime
Night Evening Difference N(Night) N(Evening)
Phase I 7.07 4.85 -2.23*** 124 124
(2.79) (2.54) (0.34)
Phase II 6.23 4.32 -1.91*** 116 116
(2.92) (2.28) (0.34)
Phase III 4.32 4.58 0.25 59 59
(2.42) (2.47) (0.45)
Phase IV 3.26 5.25 1.99*** 172 172
(2.00) (2.58) (0.25)
Note: Summary statistics of crime group outcomes is created using
Boston Police Department's Incident Report data from 2013 to 2017.
Omitted are holidays and June 2015 (due to missing data). Included
are crime incidents, which occurred on weekend evenings (8:0011:15
p.m.) and late nights (12:153:00 a.m. in Period 1 and 12:152:30 a.m.
in Period 2). Violent crime includes simple and aggravated assault, rob-
bery, homicide, and harassment (only present in Period 2 data). Prop-
erty crime consists of residential, commercial and other burglary, motor
vehicle and other larceny and motor vehicle theft. Standard errors are
reported in the parentheses.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Signifi-
cant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.6: The Effect of LNS on Crime Group Outcomes Based on the Proximity
to MBTA Stops
Period 1: LNS Launch
Dep. Var. Property Crime Violent Crime
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LNS Launch x Late Night 0.0555 0.5418∗ -0.1620 -0.6444∗∗ -0.0410 0.3735∗
(0.2996) (0.2872) (0.2219) (0.3104) (0.2840) (0.1992)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV 2.52 2.13 1.18 2.60 2.00 1.03
Period 2: LNS Termination
Dep. Var. Property Crime Violent Crime
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LNS Term. x Late Night -0.0683 -0.0685 -0.1821 -1.1836∗∗∗ -0.2527 -0.3133
(0.3008) (0.2686) (0.2284) (0.3007) (0.2659) (0.2659)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 1.72 1.47 1.10 1.56 1.49 1.26
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToD FE X X X X X X
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant
crime incidents from LNS-active MBTA stops. Included are three groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200
500m, and 3) above 500m from an MBTA stop. In Period 2, I exclude MBTA stops that were
part of bus lines eliminated from LNS (as described in the Background). I utilize a difference-
in-difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:153:00 a.m. in Period 1 and 12:152:30 a.m.
in Period 2) represent the treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the
control group. In all regressions, I control for month and day of the week*time of the day fixed
effects. Violent crime includes simple and aggravated assault, robbery, homicide, and harassment
(only present in Period 2 data). Property crime consists of residential, commercial and other
burglary, motor vehicle and other larceny and motor vehicle theft. The regressions use Boston
Police Department's Incident Report data from 2013 to 2017. Omitted are holidays and June
2015 (due to missing data).
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.7: The Effect of LNS Launch on Crime Group Outcomes Based on the
Proximity to Late Night Venues
Period 1: LNS Launch
Dep. Var. Property Crime Violent Crime
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LNS Launch x Late Night 0.2204 0.1317 0.0831 0.0550 -0.0185 -0.3483
(0.3247) (0.2220) (0.2332) (0.3309) (0.2141) (0.2407)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV 2.88 1.40 1.55 2.84 1.19 1.59
Period 2: LNS Termination
Dep. Var. Property Crime Violent Crime
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LNS Term. x Late Night -0.1336 -0.1480 -0.0374 -1.1010∗∗∗ -0.4108∗ -0.2378
(0.3314) (0.2289) (0.2519) (0.3395) (0.2344) (0.2895)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 1.97 1.08 1.23 1.90 0.97 1.43
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToD FE X X X X X X
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant
crime incidents from late night liquor venues. Included are three distance groups: 1) 0200m,
2) 200500m, and 3) above 500m from a late night venue. I utilize a difference-in-difference
strategy. Late weekend nights (12:153:00 a.m. in Period 1 and 12:152:30 a.m. in Period 2)
represent the treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group.
In all regressions, I control for month and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. Violent
crime includes simple and aggravated assault, robbery, homicide, and harassment (only present
in Period 2 data). Property crime consists of residential, commercial and other burglary, motor
vehicle and other larceny and motor vehicle theft. The regressions use Boston Police Department's
Incident Report data from 2013 to 2017. Omitted are holidays and June 2015 (due to missing
data).
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.8: The Effect of LNS Termination on Crime Group Outcomes: Horse-Race
Between MBTA Stops and Late Night Liquor Venues
Period 2
Dep. Var. Violent Crime
0-200m 200-500m
LNS Term. X Bars and Stops -1.1465∗∗∗ -0.5510∗∗∗ -0.1303 -0.5162
(0.3633) (0.1672) (0.1368) (0.4003)
LNS Term. X Bars -0.1416 -0.6951 -0.0910 -0.2578
(0.1272) (0.5610) (0.1425) (0.4456)
LNS Term. X Stops -0.1693 -0.6857 0.0149 0.1271
(0.1227) (0.4381) (0.1488) (0.3751)
N 1386 1386 1386 1386
Mean DV 0.81 0.39
Month FE X X X X
DoW*ToD FE X X X X
Estimation OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant
crime incidents from LNS active MBTA stops and late night venues. In the first two columns,
following groups are included: 1) Bars and MBTA stops group: 0200m from an MBTA stop
and within 500m from a late night venue, and vice versa, 2) Bars group: 0200m from a late
night venue and above 500m from a MBTA stop, and 3) MBTA stops group: 0200m from an
MBTA stop and above 500m from a late night venue. In the second two columns, following
groups are included: 1) Bars and MBTA stops group: 200500m from an MBTA stop and a late
night venue, 2) Bars group: 200500m from a late night venue and above 500m from a MBTA
stop, and 3) MBTA stops group: 200500m from an MBTA stop and above 500m away from
a late night venue. I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:153:00
a.m. in Period 1 and 12:152:30 a.m. in Period 2) represent the treated group and weekend
evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group. In all regressions, I control for month
and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. Violent crime includes simple and aggravated
assault, robbery, homicide, and harassment. The regressions use Boston Police Department's
Incident Report data from 2013 to 2017.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.10: Period 1: The Effect of LNS Launch on Crime Group Outcomes in
Boston: 2015 omitted
Dependent Variable Property Crime Violent Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LNS Launch X Late Night -0.3021 -0.0430 0.3096 0.0626
(0.5273) (0.0981) (0.5287) (0.0947)
0.5670 0.6616 0.5585 0.5089
Observations 396 396 396 396
Mean DV 5.54 5.71
Month FE X X X X
DoW*ToW FE X X X X
Estimation OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Note: Aggregate level results include all relevant crime incidents that occur within the city
of Boston. In this specification, I completely exclude year 2015. I utilize a difference-in-
difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:153:00 a.m.) represent the treated group and
weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group. In all regressions, I control for
month and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. Violent crime includes simple and
aggravated assault, robbery and homicide. Property crime consists of residential, commercial
and other burglary, motor vehicle and other larceny and motor vehicle theft. All regression
use Boston Police Department's Incident Report data from 2013 to 2014.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1·1: MBTA Late Night Service and Uber POOL Timeline Split
Into Phases IIV (2013-2017)
Note: Timeline shows four late night transportation phases. Phase I is a period pre-LNS and pre-
Uber POOL. Phase II starts with the LNS introduction and ends with the Uber POOL arrival
to Boston in August 2015. Phase III spans the months, in which both LNS and Uber POOL are
available. Finally, in Phase IV, only Uber POOL remains active as LNS is terminated.
Period 1 analysis focuses on the effect of LNS launch, that is, Phase I to Phase II. Period 2 analysis
focuses on the effect of LNS termination when Uber POOL is available in Boston, that is, Phase III
to Phase IV.
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Figure 1·2: MBTA Stations by the Availability of Ridership Informa-
tion and Location
Note: The nightlife areas include Boston's block groups with more than five late night venues per
1,000 inhabitants. I only account for those venues that are allowed to serve all alcoholic beverages
and are open at least until 1:00 a.m. Most of the underground stops include the ridership data,
while there are no ridership data available for the above-ground stops.
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Figure 1·3: The Average Ridership by Day of the Week and Time of
the Day
Note: This graph plots average monthly ridership for Thursday, Friday and Saturday from September
2013 to December 2017. The evening hours include 8:0011:30 p.m., and late night hours include
00:303 a.m. Missing ridership data is replaced by zeros.
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Figure 1·4: Ring Buffers Around the LNS-Active MBTA Bus and
Subway Stops
Note: This map shows areas of Boston that are located within 200m (dark purple) or 200500m
(light purple) from an MBTA stop. Black triangles show the MBTA bus stops, which belonged to
the five bus routes excluded from the scaled back LNS in June 2015.
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Figure 1·5: Number of Selected Late Night Venues in Census Block
Groups
Note: This map shows the density of selected late night venues in Boston's census block groups.
Included are bars and night clubs that are allowed to serve all alcoholic beverages and are open at
least until 1:00 a.m.
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Figure 1·6: Ring Buffers Around Selected Late Night Venues
Note: This map shows areas of Boston that are located within 200m (dark purple) or 200500m
(light purple) from a late night venue. Included are bars and night clubs that are allowed to serve
all alcoholic beverages and are open at least until 1:00 a.m.
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Figure 1·7: Total Monthly Crime on Weekend Evenings and Late
Nights by Location Information
Note: This graph plots the number of crime incidents based on the availability of location information
and time of the day on weekends. The percentage of crimes without location is visibly larger in the
second crime dataset. Moreover, Period 1 includes a relatively large proportion of missing locations
in the first half of 2015.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Ride-Sharing on Violent Crime
in College Towns
1
2.1 Introduction
A rich and exciting nightlife, often complemented by frequent alcohol consumption,
has come to be an important part of the American college experience. (Wade 2017)
In college towns with limited transportation options, the negative consequences of
this party culture may be compounded by the unmet demand for late night trans-
portation. Intoxicated people, taking time to figure out the "best" way to get home
after a night out, may get separated from their group and be left with no options
but to walk home alone. Those who are alone and intoxicated late at night may
easily fall victim to a violent crime. In the past five years, ride-sharing services have
expanded from major cities to small towns, including many college towns. Uber has
promoted itself on campuses as a provider of safe and reliable rides. This has led to
recent cooperation between the company and some universities. (Tadic 2013) Uber
has gained widespread popularity among student populations; oftentimes it provides
convenient transportation "after a night out drinking with friends." (McFeeters 2016)
Overall, it may not be an exaggeration to say that ride-sharing services have revo-
lutionized transportation in college towns. They have become particularly valuable
at night when students seek secure and convenient transportation to and from late
1. Coauthored with David Slusky and Leon Moskatel.
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night venues.
In this study, we investigate the effect of ride-sharing on violent crime in college towns.
We utilize multiple data sources to create a unique dataset on college towns where
Uber, the largest ride-sharing company, launched its flagship UberX service between
2013 and 2017. Due to data limitations, we evaluate its impact on simple assault and
a crime group, serious violent crime, which is composed of less frequent crimes: rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault. In our empirical exercise, we take advantage of the
variation in UberX launch dates across the college towns in our sample. We employ
a fixed effect difference-in-difference technique to estimate the impact of UberX on
violent crime and conduct a placebo test as a robustness check.
Our main findings suggest that Uber's presence leads to a decrease in the occurrence
of simple assault in college towns. We do not find a significant effect of Uber's intro-
duction on serious violent crime. This study makes three main contributions. First,
we analyze the causes of and potential solutions for violent crime related to college
party culture. Second, we provide new evidence of Uber's impact on crime in smaller
towns, which tend to be neglected by similar research. Third, the findings contribute
to the growing policy-relevant literature on ride-sharing's effect on crime.
Along the lines of Section 3 in Chapter 1, we identify two counteracting channels
through which Uber can affect violent crime in college towns. Uber provides a rela-
tively safe and affordable transportation option, thereby lowering the number of op-
portunities for violent encounters. Local newspaper articles discussing Uber's launch
in their college towns support the hypothesis that Uber has gained prominence as a
transportation provider. The Cornell Daily Sun wrote about the UberX launch in
Ithaca, NY: "This fall marked the dawn of a new era of transportation for Cornell
students." (Si and Sanghani 2017) The authors also interviewed a Cornell University
student who summarized the benefits of Uber over existing public transportation: "If
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people are really in a rush, people will opt for Uber, since TCAT buses are not reliable
all the time, especially at night. For example, buses might not run, but Uber will
run. TCAT also takes much longer, and you might have to transfer from many buses,
while Uber is very simple to use."2 (Si and Sanghani 2017) Recently, some universi-
ties have teamed up with ride-sharing companies to offer discounts to students and
employees. The discounts tend to be larger during typical bar nights, suggesting
that there is a shared expectation of high UberX usage among students going out
for the night.3 (University of Alabama News Center 2018; Brownlee 2019) Anecdotal
evidence suggests that Uber is perceived as a safety- and utility-enhancing service in
college towns by students, media, and university leadership.
The availability of UberX, however, may lead to adverse changes in the nightlife be-
havior of students; more people may attend parties due to its higher convenience
or lower cost relative to the default modes of transportation. Uber's presence may
also lead to a moral hazard; students may increase alcohol consumption since getting
home after a night out now requires significantly less effort and awareness.4 Due to
the counteraction between these two opposing channels, the impact of Uber on violent
crime in the college towns remains an empirical question. We are not able to measure
whether ride-sharing availability gives way to moral hazard with our data, however,
we find that UberX's benefits as a safe transportation option outweigh any negative
effects of increased alcohol consumption.
A growing body of research investigates the effect of ride-sharing on crime in large
cities, where nightlife represents a large source of revenue and public transportation
2. Tompkins Consolidated Area Transit (TCAT) provides public transportation in Ithaca, NY,
the home of Cornell University.
3. For example, University of Alabama students, faculty, and staff receive a 25 percent discount
on Thursdays, Fridays, and Saturdays from 9:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. (University of Alabama News
Center 2018)
4. Similarly to the moral hazard channel we propose, Jackson and Owens (2011) find evidence
of an increase in alcohol consumption following an extension of late night public transportation in
Washington, DC.
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tends to be available at night.5 Park et al. (2017) find that Uber reduces the likeli-
hood of rape in New York City. Martin-Buck (2016) studies the relationship between
ride-sharing services and alcohol-related crimes in a set of cities with populations over
100,000 between 2011 and 2014. He finds that ride-sharing leads to a reduction in
fatal alcohol-related car accidents and arrests for both physical and sexual assault.
The author also demonstrates that DUI arrests decline more in cities with lower rates
of public transportation usage. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing
evidence on the impact of the ride-sharing industry on crime in smaller towns where
public transportation options tend to be quite limited.
Analyzing the impacts of ride-sharing in small towns is difficult due to the lack of
demand, which only allows for a few drivers to operate. Therefore, the effect of ride-
sharing would likely be too small to detect using empirical analysis. We overcome
this issue of insufficient demand by focusing on college towns. College towns are a
notably relevant choice for investigating the impact of ride-sharing on violent crime.
One reason is that smaller towns in the US do not typically have comprehensive pub-
lic transportation, especially late at night. While a typical small-town resident relies
on their own vehicle for transportation, college students are far less likely to have a
car available. Additionally, relative to other similarly-sized towns, college communi-
ties tend to have thriving nightlife scenes, making the concerns regarding negative
aspects of party culture more pronounced.6 In their study on the costs associated
with college nightlife, Lindo, Siminski, and Swensen (2018) show that football games,
which intensify partying among college students, lead to increases in rape and alcohol-
related crimes.7 Altogether, it is likely that ride-sharing has high demand in college
5. For example, a late night or 24-hour service is offered in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York,
Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, DC (MBTA 2015)
6. Based on Uber's spokeswoman Kelly Smith, the demand for its services is higher in college
towns than in other places. (McFeeters 2016)
7. These include disorderly conduct, DUI, drunkenness, and liquor law violations.
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towns; this allows us to conduct an empirical analysis of the ride-sharing effects in a
subset of relatively small cities.
Our study suggests that insufficient late night transportation in college towns con-
tributes to the occurrence of violent crime. Therefore, services that can provide
students with affordable and reliable transportation can reduce the level of violent
crime. This study adds to a growing body of research analyzing the effects of the
ride-sharing industry on crime. The findings may inform public policy and support
cooperation among universities, local governments, and ride-sharing businesses.
2.2 Background
In Section 2.2 of Chapter 1, we elaborate on the evolution and significance of Uber
in the ride-sharing industry. We complement this discussion with additional facts on
the expansion of Uber to more US cities between 2013 and 2017. Uber has been the
first ride-sharing provider in most metropolitan areas, so its launch date serves as an
acceptable indicator of ride-sharing availability in a given area. We focus on Uber's
flagship service, UberX, which the company tends to offer as its initial service.8
While Uber's expansion is guided by potential demand in local markets, its launch
dates include an element of randomness due to the attitudes of local governments.
Uber is known for its aggressive expansion strategies. It often encounters issues
with local regulators, which in some cases have led to prolonged negotiations. Uber
launched its service in Eugene, OR in July 2014 without obtaining a legal license to
operate in the city.9 In April 2015, Uber announced the decision to pause its services
in the area due to the Eugene City Council's regulatory decisions. (Uber 2015b) It was
not until September 2018, after local politicians revised the rules governing the pro-
8. Uber's newer services, such as Uber POOL and Uber POOL Express are only available in select
cities. In smaller towns, the volume of rides is likely insufficient for the shared services.
9. Eugene, OR is the home of the University of Oregon.
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hire services, that Uber returned to Eugene. (Theen 2018) In another example, this
time from Kansas, Uber suspended operations statewide due to regulatory conflicts
in early May 2015. Just a few weeks later, however, a less stringent bill was passed
and Uber resumed its operations.10 (Lowry 2015)
These examples illustrate that Uber's expansion has not been immediately accepted
by some local governments. There are two takeaways from this section relevant to
our empirical analysis. First, we need to incorporate disruptions in Uber's services
in order to only capture periods during which Uber is truly active in a local market.
Second, while we would expect Uber launch dates to be correlated with population
size, Uber may have launched its services later than expected in some markets due
to issues with local legislators.
2.3 Data
In our analysis, we incorporate multiple data sources to form a comprehensive dataset
on relevant college towns. First, we use Slusky and Moskatel's (2019) dataset of
UberX launch dates, which was constructed by manually searching the Uber News-
room blog and supplemented by other publications, to gather launch dates between
2013 and 2017. We complement this data source with the Forbes dataset of Uber
launches that is publicly available on GitHub website.11 Second, we merge our UberX
launch dataset with the FBI's 20112017 Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program
Summary Reporting System (SRS) data. Each month, the SRS provides the sum of
incidents as detailed by police departments. The obvious drawback of this crime data
is the lack of temporal precision. However, the SRS is far more comprehensive than
10. Originally, the Kansas Bureau of Investigation was meant to conduct the background checks
of Uber drivers. Uber disagreed with this provision. Under the new bill, Uber can conduct its own
background checks. (Lowry 2015)
11. In case of launch date inconsistencies between the two datasets, we keep the Slusky and Moska-
tel's (2019) launch dates. The Forbes dataset does not explicitly focus on the UberX service, so earlier
launch dates indicate Uber Black service.
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the National Incident-Based Reporting Systeman alternative UCR crime dataset
with incident-level statisticsin terms of police participation. As power is critical for
our empirical exercise, we use the SRS for our crime data. UberX typically launches
its services in cities, but some UberX launch announcements cover broader geographic
areas. In these cases, we assign the associated launch date to all police departments
located in the area. Third, we utilize the Colleges and Universities dataset avail-
able on the Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data website.12 It includes
all post-secondary educational facilities and their characteristics, such as total enroll-
ment. Finally, we use the 2012 Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk, which
allows us to relate data at the local, police department level to Census Bureau data.
We further restrict the sample to include only college towns. We intend to capture
towns in which higher education represents an important part of the local economy.
We define college town as one with a maximum of 150,000 inhabitants and a student
population making up at least 20 percent of those inhabitants.13 Each location was
manually checked to ensure that none are adjacent to a big city. Students at such
a location would likely engage in nightlife activities in the city rather than in the
college town itself. We include only those towns that are at least a 30-minute drive
from the principal city.14
Furthermore, some of the towns in our sample are part of a metropolitan statisti-
cal area (MSA). Initially, we only considered those MSAs with under 250,000 in-
habitants.15 The strict MSA cutoff would perform well in excluding cities such as
Dayton, OH with a city population of just over 140,000 inhabitantsalthough the
12. The website belongs to the US Department of Homeland Security.
13. We remove institutions that mostly provide online education, such as Excelsior College or
Kaplan University.
14. An example of an excluded university is Boston College. While it is located in Newton, MA,
public transportation there allows for easy access to downtown Boston, a major urban area.
15. There are 21 college towns in our sample that are not part of MSAs and 49 college towns that
are part of MSAs with less than 250,000 inhabitants.
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requirements for population and student proportion are satisfied, its metropolitan
area includes almost 800,000 inhabitants and is known for its proximity to an air
force base rather than the presence of colleges. There are instances, however, of
towns that are generally considered to be college towns but do not satisfy the MSA
restriction. Therefore, we additionally implemented a set of exceptions to the MSA
cutoff. First, we include towns with larger MSAs as long as the MSA is not centered
around a single principal city, but is composed of multiple cities without a clear cen-
tral location.16 Second, we also include towns in which the university significantly
contributes to the local economy. Specifically, we add towns in which the university
is one of the top three largest employers.17
To summarize, we constructed our college town crime dataset using multiple data
sources. We also established criteria to define a college town. The list of college
towns and the associated post-secondary institutions is presented in Figure 2·1. We
provide examples of towns that failed one of the college town criteria in Table 2.1.
The next section details our main empirical exercise.
2.4 Empirical Exercise
2.4.1 Empirical Method
We aggregate the crime data into a quarterly panel of criminal offenses per police
department. We use the fixed effect difference-in-difference methodology to determine
the causal impact of UberX in college towns. We focus on four types of violent crime:
rape, robbery, simple assault, and aggravated assault. We create a crime group
titled serious violent crime by aggregating rape, robbery, and aggravated assault;
16. An example of this type of college town is Chapel Hill, NC, home to the University of North
Carolina. The town is part of the Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA. The two cities represent two MSA
centers, and the car drive between the two cities typically exceeds 30 minutes.
17. Madison, WI is home to the University of WisconsinMadison; the university is the second
biggest employer in the town. However, we exclude Charleston, SC, whose biggest employer is, by
far, the company Boeing.
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these crimes represent serious offenses that do not individually occur with sufficient
frequency whereas simple assault is one of the most common crimes and is treated as a
misdemeanor in most jurisdictions. The following is the main empirical specification:
Crimepq = α + β ∗ UberXactivepq + δq + λp + pq , (2.1)
where Crimepq represents the number of incidents (per thousand inhabitants) re-
ported by the police department p in a quarter q. UberXactivepq is a dummy vari-
able equal to one when UberX is active in the police department's p area in a quarter
q. We incorporate both the quarter and the police department fixed effects, δq and
λp, respectively. The police department fixed effect captures any time-invariant dif-
ferences in the level of crime across police departments. The quarterly fixed effect
controls for common seasonal variations in crime outcomes. As was done in Chapter
1, we estimate the coefficients using both OLS and Poisson methods.
2.4.2 Data Description
The final sample consists of crime reports from 86 police departments in 39 different
states from 2011 to 2016. The locations of these college towns are shown in Figure
2·2. The histogram in Figure 2·3 plots the frequency of UberX launches. While Uber
enters new areas throughout the entire period, it often launches in multiple locations
at (or around) the same time. In Summer 2014, for example, Uber announced that
it was expanding into 22 college towns. (Hlavaty 2014) Since the UCR dataset is
currently only available up to 2016, the college towns where Uber launched in 2017
are only captured during their pre-Uber period.
Next, we investigate the factors related to the timing of UberX's college-town in-
troductions. Figure 2·4a shows the relationship between population size and UberX
launch. The bigger college towns tend to receive UberX sooner, though there is a lot
67
of noise in the graph. Similarly, Figure 2·4b plots total enrollment in college towns
based on their UberX launch month and shows a similar result. Finally, Figure 2·4c
plots the relationship between the ratio of students to all inhabitants and the UberX
launch. The lack of a visible trend suggests that Uber did not enter cities based on
the importance of the universities to the local economy, proxied by the relative size
of the student population.
In some cases, the enrollment-to-population ratio in Figure 2·4c exceeds one, signal-
ing that the number of students is larger than the number of inhabitants captured
by the census.18 Some college students may select their parents' home as their usual
residence, which is the definition used by the census for population statistics.19 If the
population data omits a significant fraction of students, the analysis would overesti-
mate the crime outcomes per capita, putting a large weight on crime in low-populated
towns with relatively high, but uncounted, enrollment. Therefore, in our main regres-
sion specification, we add student population to the census population count: total
population = census population + total enrollment. Reassuringly, these results are
robust to the alternative measurement of population, in which total enrollment is
excluded.
Table 2.2 contains college town characteristics. The average census-reported popula-
tion is about 59,000 and mean total enrollment amounts to about 26,000 students.20
The average MSA population size among college towns that are part of MSAs is just
under 250,000 inhabitants. Our sample includes an average of 3.16 college towns per
18. This issue includes the following college town-university pairs: Clemson, SC (13,905 inhabi-
tants) and Clemson University (18,395 enrollment); Durham, NH (14,638 inhabitants) and the Uni-
versity of New Hampshire (12,653 enrollment); New Castle, DE (5,285 inhabitants) and Wilmington
University (8,377 enrollment).
19. The US Census determines residence based on the concept of "usual residence." Thus, university
students living in an on-campus or off-campus residence most of the time are likely included in their
college town population count. (U.S. Bureau Census Population Division 2019)
20. Total enrollment is constructed as a sum of enrollment data from all universities in a college
town.
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state. The crime statistics show that simple assault is by far the most frequent violent
crime with an average rate of 188 incidents per quarter. Simple assault is followed by
aggravated assault and robbery. As expected, reported rape has a relatively low fre-
quencysexual assault tends to be underreported. Students who are victims of rape
and sexual assault are even less likely than the average person to report the crime to
police, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics.21 (Sinozich and Langton 2014)
The low occurrence limits the ability of this analysis to look individually at the three
serious crimes. Instead, we focus on the joint variable, serious violent crime, and find
an average rate of 64 incidents per quarter.
The statistics also exhibit a large degree of variation in crime occurrence, since crime
levels tend to be positively correlated with the population size. Therefore, we use
the normalized crime outcomes by population throughout the analysis: crime out-
come per 1,000 inhabitants = crime outcome/total population (1,000s). In Figure
2·5, the transformed simple assault figure and population size display a weak posi-
tive correlation. The transformed serious violent crime figure is not correlated with
population. The fact that crime rates are similar across the population spectrum
serves as reassurance for our empirical strategy. It provides suggestive evidence that
we are not combining college towns with inherently different crime dynamics, which
would potentially violate the assumption of parallel trends in the absence of UberX's
launch.22
2.4.3 Results
Table 2.3 presents the main results of our analysis. The first two columns measure the
impact of UberX's launch on the rate of simple assault. Both coefficients are negative
and significant. The OLS results suggest that UberX leads to a reduction of simple
21. 20 percent reported compared to 32 percent reported by non-students of the same age.
22. We further address this concern in Section 2.4.4.
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assault by an average of 0.074 incidents per 1,000 inhabitants each quarter. We do not
find a significant effect of UberX's launch on serious violent crime. While positive, the
coefficients are insignificant. In Table 2.4, we show results of the same specification
using an alternative population measurement in which we do not add total enrollment
to the census-reported town population. The results remain consistent in terms of
their magnitude and significance.
Our findings suggest that, by providing safe and reliable late night transportation, the
presence of UberX leads to a reduction in simple assault in college towns. While ride-
sharing availability may encourage increased alcohol consumption (increasing the risk
of violent crime), the benefits of ride-sharing clearly outweigh that negative. The lack
of a significant result on serious violent crime does not allow for strong conclusions.
2.4.4 Robustness Check
In this section, we address the main concern of the empirical analysis. The identifying
assumption of the difference-in-difference technique is that, in the absence of UberX's
introduction, crime trends in the control and treated college towns would have been
the same. Given that population and total enrollment are somewhat negatively cor-
related with the UberX introduction, we may worry that crime patterns in college
towns that received UberX at the beginning of the period differ from those college
towns in which UberX did not launch until the end of the period.
We provide suggestive evidence that the parallel trends condition is satisfied by fo-
cusing on the 20112014 period (prior to Uber's operation in any of the college towns
in our sample). We calculate the percent change in both crime outcomes between
2012 and 2014 for each college town and plot the relationship between the percent
change in crime and the UberX launch month. Figures 2·6a and 2·6b both show
flat trends; the changes in crime in the pre-treatment period are independent of the
UberX introduction date.
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We also conduct a placebo regression using the same specification as our main anal-
ysis. The placebo UberX launch is moved back for each college town by 20 months.
The placebo UberX expansion into college towns begins around the middle of the
pre-treatment period.23
The placebo results in Table 2.5 show that the coefficient of interest in the first two
columns is, at most, about a tenth of the coefficients in our main results. In other
words, the placebo results in a precise zero estimates. This finding is consistent with
our interpretation of the main results. That is, the decline of simple assault in college
towns is driven by the UberX launch, not by unrelated changes in crime trends across
college towns. The placebo UberX launch's effect on serious violent crime is positive
and insignificant. Finally, placebo results are robust to alternative placebo UberX
launch dates.
2.5 Conclusion
In the absence of late night public transportation and a limited supply of taxis in
college towns, university students are left with few ways to get home after a night
out. When the choice of transportation is unclear, crowds of attendees tend to gather
outside of bars and night clubs after closing. The time spent in these areas is particu-
larly prone to violent incidents since it involves interaction among copious intoxicated
people. In this study, we bring attention to UberX as a service that provides quick,
safe, and relatively affordable late night transportation and ultimately reduces the
incidence of simple assault. By reducing the time spent around late night venues after
closing, UberX effectively limits the number of opportunities for a risky encounter.
This study did not speak to the gender-specific impacts of UberX. It is possible that
Uber's availability is uniquely appealing to women. When going out, women tend to
23. For example, the college towns where UberX launched in April 2014 are associated with a
placebo UberX launch in August 2012.
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be dependent on the choices made by their friends, as walking home by themselves is
often considered too dangerous. Staying at a party while intoxicated or sleeping at
someone else's house may lead to potentially risky situations, such as acquaintance
rape, the most common form of rape among college students. (Fisher, Cullen, and
Turner 2015) Ride-sharing services give women the ability to leave late night venues
independently. Since a large fraction of sexual crimes in this context go unreported,
evaluating the effect of UberX's presence on sexual assault alone is outside the scope
of this study. Finally, this chapter excludes the effect of UberX on DUI prevalence.
Since there is some evidence that Uber reduces the rate of DUIs, our study captures
only a subset of Uber's benefits in college towns.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Examples of Towns Excluded Due to College Town Criteria
Panel A: Proximity to Large Urban Area
College town Largest Institution City
East Lansing, MI Michigan State University Lansing, MI
Longmeadow, MA Bay Path University Springfield, MA
Newton, MA Boston College Boston, MA
Panel B: MSA Population Above 250,000 and Not Top 3 Employer
College town Largest Institution MSA Pop.
Charleston, SC Trident Technical College 744,526
Dayton, OH Wright State University 800,909
Flint, MI Baker College 410,849
Lafayette, LA University of Louisiana at Lafayette 490,488
Panel C: Below 20% Student Population Cut-Off
College town Largest Institution Student/Pop. Ratio
Bangor, ME Husson University 0.19
Beaumont, TX Lamar University 0.15
Fargo, ND North Dakota University 0.14
Topeka, KS Washburn University 0.18
York, PA York College of Pennsylvania 0.17
Note:
Panel A: Towns that satisfy all college town criteria, except they are located major urban area (less than a 30-
minute drive).
Panel B: Towns that satisfy all college town criteria, except they are the principal city of a MSA with population
above 250,000 inhabitants (measured in 2015). The universities are also not among the top three employers.
Panel C: Towns that satisfy all college town criteria, except their student to population ratio is below 20%.
The college town criteria are described in more detail in Section 2.3.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Police Departments and Crime Dataset
Characteristics of the Panel Dataset
Total College Towns (0 - 50,000 Pop.) 37
Total College Towns (50,000 - 100,000 Pop.) 37
Total College Towns (100,000 - 150,000 Pop.) 12
Number of States (<150,000 Pop.) 39
Total Quarters (2011 - 2016) 24
Characteristics of Police Departments (<150,000 Pop.)
Mean Std. Dev.
Population (1000s) 59.04 33.56
MSA Population (1000s) 248.52 199.22
Total Enrollment (1000s) 26.08 13.10
Enrollment to Population 0.54 0.31
Number of College Towns per State 3.16 1.87
Rape per Quarter 7.56 6.44
Robbery per Quarter 16.41 24.53
Simple Assault per Quarter 188.38 186.93
Aggravated Assault per Quarter 34.86 34.10
Serious Violent Crime per Quarter 64.33 60.04
Crime per 1,000 Inhabitants
Mean Std. Dev.
Simple Assault per Quarter 1.99 1.36
Serious Violent Crime per Quarter 0.67 0.48
Rape per Quarter 0.08 0.06
Robbery per Quarter 0.17 0.20
Aggravated Assault per Quarter 0.38 0.29
Note: This table summarizes the sample of police departments located in the college towns and their
associated crime levels. The crime outcomes per 1,000 inhabitants are constructed using total population,
that is, census reported population plus total enrollment. Serious violent crime group consists of rape,
robbery and aggravated assault.
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Table 2.3: The Effect of UberX on Violent Crime Outcomes in College Towns
Dependent Variable Simple Assault Serious Violent Crime
per 1,000 Inhabitants per 1,000 Inhabitants
UberX Launch -0.0738∗∗ -0.0364∗∗ 0.0105 0.0194
(0.0334) (0.0163) (0.0176) (0.0232)
N 1836 1836 1496 1496
Mean DV 1.99 0.67
Estimation OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
PD FE YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Quarterly panel of crime reported by each police department spans the years 2011 to 2016.
Crime outcomes per 1,000 inhabitants are constructed using total population, that is, census
reported population plus total enrollment. Only those college towns, in which UberX launched by
June 2017, are included. Extreme crime values are replaced by missing values. We define a college
town police department as one with a jurisdiction over cities with less than 150,000 inhabitants,
total enrollment of at least 3,000 students, and the student populations equal to at least 20% of
the total population. The MSA population must be under 250,000 inhabitants, unless: 1) the
college town belongs to a multi-principal city MSA or 2) the university belongs to the top three
employers. The college town criteria are described in more detail in Section 2.3. University police
departments are excluded.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.4: The Effect of UberX on Violent Crime Outcomes in College Towns: Al-
ternative Population Measure
Dependent Variable Simple Assault Serious Violent Crime
per 1,000 Inhabitants per 1,000 Inhabitants
UberX Launch -0.1001∗∗ -0.0338∗∗ 0.0221 0.0253
(0.0471) (0.0160) (0.0256) (0.0236)
N 1836 1836 1496 1496
Mean DV 2.87 0.97
Estimation OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
PD FE YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Quarterly panel of crime reported by each police department spans the years 2011 to 2016.
Crime outcomes per 1,000 inhabitants are constructed using only the census reported population
(calculation excludes total enrollment). Only those college towns, in which UberX launched by
June 2017, are included. Extreme crime values are replaced by missing values. We define a college
town police department as one with a jurisdiction over cities with less than 150,000 inhabitants,
total enrollment of at least 3,000 students, and the student populations equal to at least 20% of
the total population. The MSA population must be under 250,000 inhabitants, unless: 1) the
college town belongs to a multi-principal city MSA or 2) the university belongs to the top three
employers. The college town criteria are described in more detail in Section 2.3. University police
departments are excluded.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Placebo UberX on Violent Crime Outcomes in College
Towns
Dependent Variable Simple Assault Serious Violent Crime
per 1,000 Inhabitants per 1,000 Inhabitants
Placebo UberX Launch 0.0005 0.0034 0.0080 0.0202
(0.0429) (0.0191) (0.0237) (0.0301)
N 936 936 762 762
Mean DV 2.02 0.68
Estimation OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
PD FE YES YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES YES
Note: Quarterly panel of crime reported by each police department spans the years 2011 to
2014. Placebo UberX launch was created by moving the actual introductory month for each
college town by 24 months. rime outcomes per 1,000 inhabitants are constructed using total
population, that is, census reported population plus total enrollment. Only those college towns,
in which UberX launched by June 2017, are included. Extreme crime values are replaced by
missing values. We define a college town police department as one with a jurisdiction over cities
with less than 150,000 inhabitants, total enrollment of at least 3,000 students, and the student
populations equal to at least 20% of the total population. The MSA population must be under
250,000 inhabitants, unless: 1) the college town belongs to a multi-principal city MSA or 2) the
university belongs to the top three employers. The college town criteria are described in more
detail in Section 2.3. University police departments are excluded.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2·1: List of College Towns and the Associated Largest Post-
Secondary Institution
College town Largest Institution
Ames, IA Iowa State University
Amherst, MA University Of Massachusetts-Amherst
Ann Arbor, MI University Of Michigan-Ann Arbor
Athens, GA University of Georgia
Auburn, AL Auburn University
Bellingham, WA Whatcom Community College
Bethlehem, PA Lehigh University
Blacksburg, VA Virginia Polytechnic Institute And State University
Bloomington, IN Indiana University-Bloomington
Boulder, CO University Of Colorado Boulder
Bowling Green, KY Western Kentucky University
Burlington, VT University Of Vermont
Carbondale, IL Southern Illinois University-Carbondale
Cedar Falls, IA University Of Northern Iowa
Champaign, IL University Of Illinois At Urbana-Champaign
Chapel Hill, NC University Of North Carolina At Chapel Hill
Charlottesville, VA Piedmont Virginia Community College
Clemson, SC Clemson University
College Station, TX Texas A & M University-College Station
Columbia, MO Columbia College
Denton, TX University Of North Texas
Dover, DE Delaware Technical Community College-Terry
Durham, NH University Of New Hampshire-Main Campus
Eau Claire, WI University Of Wisconsin-Eau Claire
Edinburg, TX University Of Texas Rio Grande Valley
Eugene, OR University Of Oregon
Fairfield, CT Sacred Heart University
Fayetteville, AR University Of Arkansas
Flagstaff, AZ Northern Arizona University
Fort Collins, CO Colorado State University-Fort Collins
Glassboro, NJ Rowan University
Grand Forks, ND University Of North Dakota
Greenville, NC East Carolina University
Greenville, SC Greenville Technical College
Hammond, LA Southeastern Louisiana University
Hanover, NH Dartmouth College
Harrisburg, PA Harrisburg Area Community College-Harrisburg
Harrisonburg, VA James Madison University
Hattiesburg, MS University Of Southern Mississippi
Hays, KS Fort Hays State University
Iowa City, IA University Of Iowa
Johnson City, TN East Tennessee State University
Kalamazoo, MI Western Michigan University
(a) Part 1
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College town Largest Institution
Kent, OH Kent State University At Kent
Knoxville, TN Pellissippi State Community College
La Crosse, WI University Of Wisconsin-La Crosse
Laramie, WY University Of Wyoming
Las Cruces, NM New Mexico State University-Dona Ana
Macon, GA Mercer University
Madison, WI University Of Wisconsin-Madison
Manhattan, KS Kansas State University
Mankato, MN Minnesota State University-Mankato
Mcallen, TX South Texas College
Morgantown, WV West Virginia University
Mount Pleasant, MI Central Michigan University
Muncie, IN Ball State University
New Brunswick, NJ Rutgers University-New Brunswick
New Haven, CT Yale University
Newark, DE University Of Delaware
Normal, IL Illinois State University
Ogden, UT Weber State University
Orem, UT Utah Valley University
Orono, ME University Of Maine
Oshkosh, WI University Of Wisconsin-Oshkosh
Oxford, OH Miami University-Oxford
Pemberton, NJ Rowan College At Burlington County
Pocatello, ID Idaho State University
Provo, UT Brigham Young University-Provo
Randolph, NJ County College Of Morris
Rexburg, ID Brigham Young University-Idaho
San Luis Obispo, CA Cuesta College
San Marcos, TX Texas State University
Santa Barbara, CA University Of California-Santa Barbara
South Bend, IN Indiana University-South Bend
St Cloud, MN Saint Cloud State University
Statesboro, GA Georgia Southern University
Stillwater, OK Oklahoma State University-Main Campus
Terre Haute, IN Indiana State University
Tuscaloosa, AL University Of Alabama
Tyler, TX University Of Texas At Tyler
Valdosta, GA Wiregrass Georgia Technical College
Waco, TX Baylor University
West Lafayette, IN Purdue University-Main Campus
West Long Branch, NJ Monmouth University
Williamsport, PA Pennsylvania College Of Technology
Ypsilanti, MI Eastern Michigan University
(b) Part 2
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Figure 2·2: Location of College Towns
Note: This map shows the location of college towns included in the sample. We define college town
as a city with less than 150,000 inhabitants, total enrollment of at least 3,000 students, and the
student population equal to at least 20% of the total population. The MSA population must be
under 250,000 inhabitants, unless: 1) the college town belongs to a multi-principal city MSA or 2)
the university belongs to the top three employers. The college town criteria are described in more
detail in Section 2.3.
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Figure 2·3: Frequency of UberX Launch in the College Towns by
Month
Note: This histogram shows frequency of UberX launch in the college towns included in the sample.
We define college town as a city with less than 150,000 inhabitants, total enrollment of at least
3,000 students, and the student population equal to at least 20% of the total population. The
MSA population must be under 250,000 inhabitants, unless: 1) the college town belongs to a multi-
principal city MSA or 2) the university belongs to the top three employers. The college town criteria
are described in more detail in Section 2.3.
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Figure 2·4: Relationship Between the Size of College Town and UberX
Launch Date
(a) Population (b) Total Enrollment
(c) Total Enrollment Over Population
Note: This graph plots college town's UberX launch on the horizontal axis and the (a) population
size, (b) total enrollment, and (c) ratio of student population to all inhabitants on the vertical axis.
Total enrollment consists of the enrollment at all higher education institution in each college town.
We define a college town police department as one with a jurisdiction over cities with less than
150,000 inhabitants, total enrollment of at least 3,000 students, and the student populations equal
to at least 20% of the total population. The MSA population must be under 250,000 inhabitants,
unless: 1) the college town belongs to a multi-principal city MSA or 2) the university belongs to the
top three employers. The college town criteria are described in more detail in Section 2.3. University
police departments are excluded from the graph.
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Figure 2·5: Relationship Between Average Quarterly Crime Outcomes
per Capita and Population
(a) Simple Assault (b) Serious Violent Crime
Note: This graph plots college town's total population on the horizontal axis and the 20112016
average quarterly crime per 1,000 inhabitants in its associated police department on the vertical
axis. We define a college town police department as one with a jurisdiction over cities with less than
150,000 inhabitants, total enrollment of at least 3,000 students, and the student populations equal
to at least 20% of the total population. The MSA population must be under 250,000 inhabitants,
unless: 1) the college town belongs to a multi-principal city MSA or 2) the university belongs to the
top three employers. The college town criteria are described in more detail in Section 2.3. University
police departments are excluded from the graph.
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Figure 2·6: Relationship Between the Change in Crime Before UberX
Launch (20122014) and UberX Launch Date
(a) Simple Assault (b) Serious Violent Crime
Note: This graph shows the percentage crime change between 2012 and 2014, using the first two
quarters of each year. The statistic is related to the UberX launch on the horizontal axis. Crime
outcomes per 1,000 inhabitants are constructed using total population, that is, census reported pop-
ulation plus total enrollment. We define a college town police department as one with a jurisdiction
over cities with less than 150,000 inhabitants, total enrollment of at least 3,000 students, and the
student populations equal to at least 20% of the total population. The MSA population must be
under 250,000 inhabitants, unless: 1) the college town belongs to a multi-principal city MSA or 2)
the university belongs to the top three employers. The college town criteria are described in more
detail in Section 2.3. University police departments are excluded. Serious violent crime category
includes aggravated assault, robbery and rape. One extreme value of violent crime per capita is
dropped.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Daddy Quota on Gender Labor
Market Outcomes
1
3.1 Introduction
In developed countries, parental leave is typically a gender-neutral policy that, in
theory, enables parents to share their absence from the labor market due to family-
related responsibilities. While the structure and generosity of these policies vary,
in practice, women are more likely than men to take advantage of parental leave in
every OECD country. Men make up just one in five parents who take advantage of
the publicly-administered paid parental leave. (OECD 2016) The existing literature
has primarily analyzed the direct effects of parental leave policies on the outcomes
for parents and children. It has not sufficiently considered the indirect effects of the
take-up gap between mothers and fathers on gender disparities in the labor market.
In this study, we investigate the effect of a father-specific parental leave policy, imple-
mented in Quebec, Canada, on four broad demographic groups that are not necessarily
directly affected by the policy. We provide a simple theoretical framework that for-
mally defines the mechanism through which paternity leave indirectly affects gender
differences in labor market outcomes. We consider two distinct channels: statistical
discrimination and gender norms. First, the statistical discrimination channel relates
to the expected productivity of workers from each demographic group. Employers who
1. Coauthored with Cheonghum Park.
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are obligated to provide job protection and other parental leave benefits to mothers
incur additional costs when hiring them due to the necessary hiring and training of
temporary employees to substitute mothers for the duration of their parental leave.
It is not surprising, then, that firms would engage in discriminatory behavior against
women of childbearing age who may potentially request parental leave in the future.
Employers would generally offer young women wages that are lower than those for
people from other demographic groups with similar skills. Ultimately, the policy that
is meant to help mothers strengthen their labor market attachment may prompt em-
ployers to favor hiring males.
Second, the design of parental leave policy may be able to affect the prevailing gender
norms. The primarily female take-up of parental leave promotes the traditional view
of family, one that entails a male breadwinner and a female caretaker. Such gender
norms make it challenging for women to participate in the labor market while hav-
ing young children; they can be seen as bad mothers who do not provide sufficient
childcare. Furthermore, it is difficult for career-oriented mothers to take days off and
demand work flexibly. They may worry that they will be stigmatized as another fe-
male worker pursuing the mommy track.2
Some countries have reformed their parental leave policies in an effort to reduce the
gender gap in take-up rates. The programs are typically referred to as father-specific
parental leave, paternity leave, or the daddy quota. In our analysis, we analyze a
reform enacted in Quebec, the Quebec Parental Insurance Program (QPIP), that sig-
nificantly increased the take-up of parental leave by fathers. The 2006 QPIP reform
enabled up to five weeks of paternity leave. We believe this constitutes an optimal
environment to study the effect on parental leave take-up. First, the reform's impact
on paternal behavior has been enormous. This is not typically the case for gender-
2. A common derogatory expression for the career of women who prioritize working in the home
and are therefore more willing to make career sacrifices such as declining promotions or reducing
work hours.
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neutral parental leave expansions. The proportion of fathers claiming or intending to
claim the benefit rose from 22 percent in 2004 to 83 percent in 2013, which contrasts
the modest increase from 9 percent to 13.3 percent seen in the rest of Canada. (Lero
2015) Second, QPIP has made Quebec the only province in Canada with a parental
leave policy that includes paternity leave. This enables us to compare labor market
outcomes in Quebec to those in the rest of Canada. Lastly, there is significant evi-
dence indicating the presence of a gender gap in the Canadian labor market. Despite
women surpassing men in average educational attainment, the gender wage gap and
the glass ceiling phenomenon persist. (OECD 2012) Therefore, QPIP represents an
opportunity to examine the evolution of the gender gap in the labor market following
parental leave policy reform.
Due to the features of QPIP and our dataset, we employ a difference-in-difference
technique as our main empirical strategy. Our results suggest that QPIP has led
to a significant increase in the probability of both younger and older women being
employed in Quebec. It did not impact the probability of employment for younger
men. We consider various specifications and conduct a robustness check in order to
verify that our results are driven by the QPIP reform.
3.2 Literature Review
Recent research focuses on the effect that family programs have on parents and chil-
dren, though various approaches have emerged. The first approach evaluates the ef-
fectiveness of paid parental leave extension on child development and welfare. Baker
and Milligan (2010) find that leave expansion in Canada increased the time mothers
spend with their children during the first year of their life, though they do not find
an impact on overall child development. Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) focus on
the impact of three leave expansions in Germany. They do not find evidence that
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expanded maternity leave impacted long-term child development outcomes.
The second approach of parental leave research involves examining how parental leave
duration affects the labor experiences of parents as they return to work. Proponents
of paid parental leave claim that the policy encourages gender equality by allowing
mothers to retain occupation-specific skills and match-specific search capital after the
childbirth (Schönberg and Ludsteck 2014). Opponents of generous parental leave ar-
gue that extensions in parental leave duration are associated with the loss of human
capital, network strength, and self-confidence. Such loss reduces the ability of parents
to resume their careers. Since parental leave is taken predominantly by mothers, these
studies generally investigate female labor market outcomes. However, Rossin-Slater,
Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2013) show that California's Paid Parental Leave Program
(PFL) increased the use of maternity leave without worsening mothers' labor market
outcomes. In fact, the authors document an increase in their work hours and pro-
vide evidence for wage growth. Lalive et al. (2014) analyze a series of parental leave
extensions in Austria and conclude that while the policies significantly delayed the
return to work, they do not appear to have hurt mothers' labor market outcomes in
the medium run.
The studies most relevant to our research consider the effects that parental leave
policy has on women of childbearing age in the labor market. Ruhm (1998) investi-
gates the impact of parental leave duration on female labor market outcomes in nine
European countries and finds that while extended parental leave increases female
employment, it hurts their wages. Das and Polachek (2015) estimate the effect of
PFL in California on younger women's labor force participation and unemployment.
The findings show that while PFL increases the labor force participation of young
women, it also increases the corresponding unemployment rate and the average du-
ration of unemployment. Thomas (2016) constructs an adverse selection model and
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tests its implications empirically to show that mandated maternity leave policies ben-
efit women of childbearing age by increasing the probability of remaining employed,
though they significantly limit their chances of promotion.
Another important approach to parental leave research focuses on the impact that
parental leave reforms have on fathers' participation in childcare. Bartel et al. (2018)
use California's PFL program to track the behavior of fathers. The results indicate
that men respond to expanded parental leave opportunities. Finally, Patnaik (2019)
analyzes QPIP and finds that not only did paternal take-up drastically increase,
but the provision of father-specific parental leave reduced the stigma associated with
men's participation in childcare. These results suggest that QPIP reduced gender
specialization within families, as parents' contribution to housework became more
equal. These findings provide a rationale for utilizing the QPIP in our analysis.
3.3 Background
The Employment Insurance (EI) program, one of the largest federal programs, used
to provide parental benefits throughout all of Canada. Starting in 2006, Quebec
replaced EI with its Quebec Parental Insurance Plan and began providing eligible
workers with maternity leave, paternity leave, parental leave, or adoption leave. Both
EI and QPIP are financed by payroll taxes and include a job-protecting provision.
QPIP made family benefits more generous, accessible, and flexible. The EI's criteria
for eligibility include 600 hours of insurable work, an employee status, and the pro-
gram offers C$39,000 maximum insurable earnings. QPIP requires only a minimum
of C$2,000 insurable earnings, extending the eligibility to self-employed parents or
those with non-standard employment who did not fulfill the EI's hourly criteria. Ad-
ditionally, QPIP offers maximum insurable earnings of C$57,000. QPIP lets families
choose from two plans: basic or special. The basic plan includes lower benefits for
89
a longer period (maximum 18 maternity weeks and 32 parental weeks); the special
plan shortens the benefit period but provides higher benefits (maximum 15 maternity
weeks and 25 parental weeks). (Gouvernement du Québec 2018) Altogether, these
changes increased the compensation of foregone wages and allowed more parents to
take advantage of parental benefits.
Crucially for this study, Quebec is the only province in which a portion of the parental
leave is specifically designated for fathers. The basic plan offers up to five consecutive
weeks of paternity leave with a wage replacement rate of 70 percent while the spe-
cial plan includes up to three consecutive weeks of paternity leave with a 75 percent
replacement rate. The paternity leave can begin as soon as the child is born but
must end no later than 52 weeks following the birth. The transition from EI to QPIP
increased the total amount of parental leave weeks available to fathers from 35 to
37.3 The maximum length of parental leave available to mothers was not affected. In
total, mothers' paid leave contains 18 weeks of maternity leave and up to 32 weeks
of parental leave. Overall, maximum family leave benefits increased from 50 weeks
to 55 weeks. Parents have the option to stay on the leave at the same time or in
succession.
Our analysis largely follows Patnaik's (2019) finding that the establishment of the
daddy quota made fathers stay on parental leave significantly longer. Based on her
analysis, QPIP led to a 53 percent increase in the paternal claim rate alongside an
increase in the leave duration of three weeks. Following QPIP, the average father
stayed on paternity leave for five weeks (the amount of time allocated exclusively to
fathers by the daddy quota). In comparison, Patnaik (2019) finds a positive, but in-
significant impact of QPIP on both the participation rate and average leave duration
of mothers. While the reform did not eliminate the differential uptake of the paid
3. The total amount includes 5 weeks of paternity leave and 32 weeks of gender-neutral parental
leave.
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parental leave, it contributed to its reduction.
In our analysis, we assume that younger women are only affected by QPIP through
the establishment of the daddy quota. We considered the possibility of QPIP's gen-
erosity leading to a higher participation rate among mothers (enriching employment
options for women without children), but find that Patnaik's (2019) evidence does
not support such a hypothesisthe leave-taking behavior of mothers has not been
significantly affected by QPIP. Alternatively, we thought that the larger financial
incentives from QPIP could potentially incentivize younger single women to start a
family instead of work due to the favorable family policy. Patnaik (2019) addresses
this possibility but does not find support for it.
3.4 Theoretical Framework
This section details a simple static model that provides a framework for understand-
ing the impacts of QPIP on labor market outcomes. The model distinguishes between
the statistical discrimination channel and the gender norm channel. It reveals that
the gender norm channel is a primary factor behind the increase in female employ-
ment in the equilibrium.
Household's labor supply:
Each household i, an element of the finite set of households, I, has two members
(female and male) and differs from other households only in the age of the family
members a(i) ∈ {Y,O}4 and in the heterogeneous effects of gender norms, γi(·).
(These will be described below.) The share of young households is α. Each house-
4. We assume that both family members belong to the same age group.
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hold's utility function is as follows:
wFiLFi + wMiLMi − L
2
Fi
2
− L
2
Mi
2
− γi(Q)1{LFi > 0}. (3.1)
For each member g ∈ {F,M} in household i, wgi is their wage in the labor market, Lgi
is the amount of labor supply, and γi(Q) is the fixed utility cost of female labor force
participation before (Q = 0) and after (Q = 1) the QPIP reform, (borrowed from
Thomas (2016)). We introduce heterogeneity to this participation cost. Specifically,
γi(Q) = µa(i)(Q) + ε where µO(0) > µO(1) > 0, µY (0) > µY (1) > 0 and ε ∼
Uniform[−1
2
, 1
2
]. The assumptions include that there is a positive fixed participation
cost for women and that the reform reduced the cost for both older and younger
women. Each household's optimal labor supply, given the wages and fixed utility
costs, would be as follows:
LSFi(wFi; γi(Q)) = wFi · 1
{
wFi ≥
√
2γi(Q)
}
, (3.2)
LSMi(wMi) = wMi. (3.3)
Note that female members' labor force participation is determined by the relative
level of fixed utility costs of participation and wage, while male members work for
any positive wage.
Labor market equilibrium:
We assume that each worker's expected productivity in household i follows θgi = θg,a(i)
for g = F,M , or that the expected productivity of each individual depends only on
age and gender. We also assume that the labor market is competitive and that firms
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have the following production function:5
F ({LFi, LMi}i∈I ; {wFi, wMi, θFi, θMi}i∈I) =
∑
i∈I
[LFi(θFi − wFi) + LMi(θMi − wMi)].
(3.4)
Then, the equilibrium wage w∗g,a(i) and employment l
∗
g =
∑
i L
∗
gi for i ∈ I, g = F,M ,
given Q = 0, 1, would be described as follows:
w∗g,a(i) = θg,a(i), (3.5)
l∗M,Y = θM,Y · αI, (3.6)
l∗M,O = θM,O · (1− α)I, (3.7)
l∗F,Y (Q) = θF,Y · αI · ΦY (Q), (3.8)
l∗F,O(Q) = θF,O · (1− α)I · ΦO(Q), (3.9)
where Φa(i)(Q) = min
{
max
{
θ2
F,a(i)
2
− µa(i)(Q),−12
}
+ 1
2
, 1
}
, which stands for the
labor force participation rate of women with age a(i), given Q = 0, 1. Note that Φa(i)
is decreasing weakly in µa(i).
Effects of QPIP reform:
There are two main effects of QPIP on the labor market. First, since younger men
take more weeks of leave, their expected productivity decreases. This is the statistical
discrimination channel we discussed above. Second, because QPIP challenges tradi-
tional gender norms, women face a lower barrier to participate in the labor market.
More importantly, because of the flexible usage of parental leave brought about by
the reform, overall workplace flexibility increases, meaning that the fixed utility cost
5. Note that we are abusing the notation for the expected productivity θgi in the production
function. This would generate no further complications as the expected production would be equal
to the production function with expected productivity in our case.
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of participating in the labor force decreases for women.
The statistical discrimination channel can be traced through equation (3.5), wherein
productivity loss for young men is shown to result in decreased wages. On the other
hand, the gender norms channel increases employment for both younger and older
women, as can be seen in equations (3.8) and (3.9). Hence, the two main implications
of our model would be as follows:
(1) Statistical discrimination: wages of young men will decrease.
(2) Workplace flexibility: employment of all women will increase.
In the following section, we will discuss the empirical strategy and see if the
findings are consistent with the implications of the model.
3.5 Empirical Exercise
3.5.1 Empirical Method
In the empirical analysis of the QPIP reform, we use the 20022010 Canadian Labour
Force Survey (LFS). LFS is a large monthly survey, which provides a nationally-
representative sample. LFS uses a rotating panel sample design and captures work-
related statistics. We construct four demographic groups: women and men between
17 and 49 years old with no or young children (youngest child below 5 years) and
women and men between 50 and 64 years old with no or older children (youngest
child at least 13 years old). We employ a difference-in-difference strategy in order to
determine whether the daddy quota affected the labor market outcomes of these four
groups in Quebec. The pre-reform group consists of the 20022005 data, while the
20062010 data serve as the post-reform group. As already mentioned, Quebec is the
only province in Canada that provides an individual non-transferable right to parental
leave for fathers. Therefore, Quebec represents our treated group while the rest of
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Canada serves as the control group.6 The outcome of interest is a binary variable
Employed, constructed according to the employment definition of the International
Labour Organisation.
In order to identify a causal effect of QPIP using the difference-in-difference tech-
nique, it must be the case that labor market outcomes for Quebec and the rest of
Canada would follow the same trend in the reform's absence. Figure 3·1 plots the
probability of being employed for each group, both in Quebec and the rest of Canada,
from 2002 to 2014. We formally test whether the pre-trends in employment likeli-
hood for Quebec and the control group differ and find no evidence for any significant
differences, meaning that the rest of Canada serves as an acceptable control group
in this study.7 In the case of younger women, we observe a widening of the gap in
probability of employment between Quebec and rest of Canada after 2006, which is
consistent with the timing of QPIP. However, in the empirical analysis, we must con-
sider a potential confounding factor: the significant business cycle movement during
the post-period. Canada entered a recession in 2008; if the impact of economic down-
turn differed between Quebec and the rest of Canada, our analysis would be biased.
We further analyze this issue in our robustness check.
As a starting point for our empirical strategy, we present the sample characteristics.
Table 3.1 includes summary statistics of the selected variables, separately for Quebec
and the control group, before the QPIP reform. Quebec's overall labor force par-
ticipation rate and probability of employment are both below those in the rest of
Canada during the pre-treatment period. The differences in education, age, marital
status, and probability of having children are relatively small in their magnitude and
we control for these characteristics in each specification below.
6. We combine the remaining provinces into the following five regions: Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba
and Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Atlantic Region.
7. We include the p-values of the formal test under each demographic group's graph in Figure
3·1.
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The principal empirical analysis starts with the baseline difference-in-difference re-
gression:
Yipt = α + β ∗ Aftert ∗Quebecp + γ ∗Quebecp + δ ∗ Aftert + φ ∗Xipt + ipt , (3.10)
where Yipt represents an outcome of interest for a person i living in province p surveyed
during year t ; it takes value one if the individual is employed and zero otherwise.
δt and λp denote the year and province fixed effects. Quebecp is a binary variable
taking the value of one when the individual lives in Quebec and zero if elsewhere.
Aftert takes value of one when the individual is present in the dataset following the
QPIP reform (2006 or later). Xipt is a set of personal characteristics including age,
education level, marital status, and the presence and age of children. ipt is the error
term. Standard errors are clustered at the province-year level to account for random
shocks affecting individuals in each province every year.
The generalized difference-in-difference regression with fixed effects takes the following
form:
Yipt = α + β ∗Quebecp ∗ Aftert + φ ∗Xipt + δt + λp + ipt. (3.11)
Since the sample consists of multiple provinces and periods, the second specification
adds terms δt and λp, denoting the year and province fixed effects. δt accounts for
differences over time that are common to all provinces while λp captures differences
between provinces that are constant over time.
The final specification relaxes the common effect of QPIP for all years, and instead
allows for year-specific effects of QPIP:
Yipt = α + βt ∗Quebecp ∗ Y eart + φ ∗Xipt + δt + λp + ipt. (3.12)
In all three specifications, β represents the coefficient of interest. In the first two spec-
ifications, it is equal to the average treatment effect of QPIP reform on employment
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in Quebec. In the last specification, βt contains a specific value of QPIP's effect for
each year of interest.
3.5.2 Results
Columns 14 of Table 3.2 present the results of the empirical exercise for younger
and older women. The two columns for each group's results display the coefficients
from specifications (1) and (2), respectively. The coefficient of interest is positive and
significant in both specifications for both groups. The magnitude and significance of
the QPIP effect increases alongside the inclusion of fixed effects.
The regression results of specification (3) are included in Table 3.3. Figure 3·2 depicts
the yearly coefficients for each group graphically, to allow for easier interpretation.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the likelihood of female employment in Quebec was
not significantly different from the rest of Canada before the reform. Starting in 2007,
however, the likelihood of female employment in the treated group grew significantly
higher than that in the control group. The gradual increase of QPIP's effect is
expected, as the mechanism through which the reform affects gender labor market
outcomes requires an adjustment period. Employers must observe that fathers spend
more time taking care of children, and, at least temporarily, reduce their labor supply.
The behavior of fathers, therefore, resembles that of mothers when it comes to the
reduction in labor supply associated with family responsibilities. The adjustment of
labor division within families represents a gradual process; employers are likely to
update their expectations about the labor attachment of male and female employees
as more families are exposed to QPIP.
Table 3.2 also presents the results of an analogous empirical exercise for younger and
older men in columns 5 to 8. We do not find a significant effect of QPIP on the
probability of being employed for younger men, but we do find a decrease for older
men. While our theoretical model does not provide an explanation for this finding,
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it may be caused by older women substituting older men in the job market. Figure
3·2 reveals that the yearly coefficients for men from specification (3) are mostly non-
significant.
The effect of QPIP on hourly wages of the four demographic groups are presented in
Table 3.4. The difference-in-difference results indicate that the reform had a negative
impact on the wages of younger women, older women, and younger men. The decrease
in women's wages can be explained by the increase in their employment, while the
decrease in younger men's wages is a result of the statistical discrimination channel
included in the model. The wages of older men are not significantly affected by the
reform.
3.5.3 Robustness Check
Our results could be driven by varied responses of Canadian provinces to macroeco-
nomic shocks. It is important to recall that during 2008 and 2009, Canada was im-
pacted by the Great Recession. This significant downturn may constitute a confound-
ing factor in the estimation of QPIP's effects on labor market outcomes. Specifically,
Quebec may have responded to the recession differently than the rest of Canada due
to its industrial composition. In order to investigate whether the results are driven
by differential responses to the business cycle, rather than by QPIP, we construct a
Bartik instrument. We include it as an additional control variable in the preferred
specifications of the main analysis. The instrument is constructed separately for
each demographic group as the following: average national employment growth in
18 different industries weighted by local industry employment shares. The covari-
ate therefore captures the predicted change in employment in each province based
on local industrial composition as well as national industrial trends. (Bartik 1991;
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Wozniak 2010)
Bartikgpt =
18∑
i=1
egpit−1(lnE−gpit − lnE−gpit−1)
In the formula above, egpit represents the share of province p's employment of demo-
graphic group g in industry i during year t. E−gpit stands for the national employment
of demographic group g in industry i during year t ; it excludes province p's employ-
ment in that industry. The corresponding empirical specification is as follows:
Yipt = α + βt ∗Quebecp ∗ Y eart + φ ∗Xipt + ψ ∗Bartikpt + δt + λp + ipt. (3.13)
Table 3.5 shows the estimated effect of QPIP on the likelihood of employment for each
demographic group, considering the changes in local demand. The results confirm the
importance of including the Bartik instrument as an additional control variable. The
main coefficient of interest, βt, stays consistent with the main results, suggesting that
the Great Recession cannot fully explain our findings.
3.6 Conclusion
Over the past several decades, levels of female labor force participation and female
labor force attachment have undergone substantial changes. Women now enjoy higher
degrees of economic independence and a lower amount of labor market barriers due
to changing gender norms. Despite this progress, research suggests persistence of
gender differences in labor market outcomes (glass ceiling, occupational segregation,
wage gap, etc.). It is important for policymakers to identify policies that address
the remaining disadvantages faced by women in the labor market in order to further
advance the economic status of women in our society.
Child-rearing responsibilities play a significant role in defining long-term gender dif-
ferences in the labor market. Parental leave policies are powerful public policy tools
with the ability to influence the division of child-related responsibilities. Economic
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literature has primarily focused on just a fraction of the complex effects that parental
leave policies can have. In this study, we focused on Quebec and investigated the ef-
fects of a father-specific parental leave policy on four demographic groups that would
not necessarily be directly affected by it. We find that through increasing paternal
take-up of parental leave, the QPIP reform increases the likelihood of employment for
women of all ages. This result is consistent with the change in gender norms, which
reduces barriers to employment for women. We also find that the QPIP caused a
reduction in wages for all groups but older men. The reduction in young men's wages
suggests that father-specific parental leave also reduces statistical discrimination in
the labor market. The reduction in women's wages is the consequence of increased
competition in the labor market. Overall, our findings suggest that the daddy quota
in Quebec led to the equalization of male and female labor market opportunities.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics: Quebec and Control Groups Before QPIP (2002
2005)
Quebec, Before QPIP Control, Before QPIP Difference
Labor force 0.636 0.652 0.016***
Employed 0.581 0.604 0.024***
High school or less 0.462 0.474 0.012***
Some college 0.081 0.090 0.010***
Post-secondary diploma 0.327 0.292 -0.035***
Bachelors degree 0.094 0.098 0.004***
Graduate degree 0.037 0.046 0.009***
Women 0.514 0.518 0.003***
Married 0.610 0.613 0.004***
Child 0.321 0.325 0.004***
17-19 0.048 0.052 0.004***
20-21 0.031 0.032 0.000**
22-24 0.045 0.044 -0.002***
25-26 0.030 0.028 -0.002***
27-29 0.043 0.042 -0.000
30-34 0.073 0.078 0.005***
25-26 0.088 0.090 0.002***
40-44 0.106 0.105 -0.000
45-49 0.106 0.102 -0.005***
50-59 0.094 0.089 -0.004***
55-59 0.082 0.076 -0.006***
60-64 0.064 0.058 -0.007***
65-69 0.050 0.049 -0.001***
70 & above 0.108 0.120 0.012***
N 873,600 3,947,754
Note: Summary statistics comparing the characteristics of Quebec and the control group. We
only consider the pre-treatment period (20022005).
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.3: QPIP Effect on the Probability of Employment: Yearly Coefficients
Dependent Variable Younger women Older women Younger men Older men
Quebec*2002 -0.0077 -0.0111 0.0191∗∗ 0.0048
(0.0064) (0.0074) (0.0084) (0.0082)
Quebec*2003 -0.0045 -0.0026 -0.0023 0.0071
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0089) (0.0067)
Quebec*2004 0.0001 0.0060 -0.0024 0.0092
(0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0061) (0.0077)
Quebec*2006 -0.0011 -0.0042 0.0064∗∗ -0.0111∗
(0.0051) (0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0062)
Quebec*2007 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0030 -0.0077
(0.0025) (0.0031) (0.0080) (0.0067)
Quebec*2008 0.0039 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0083 -0.0164∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0056) (0.0080)
Quebec*2009 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ -0.0001
(0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0069) (0.0077)
Quebec*2010 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0106
(0.0040) (0.0051) (0.0039) (0.0084)
N 2122089 1328309 2286983 1242603
R2 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.13
All covariates YES YES YES YES
Clustered std. e. YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents the year-specific effects of QPIP on the likelihood of employment
separately for each demographic group. Younger women and men samples consists of women
and men between 17 and 49 years old with no or young children (youngest child below 5
years). Older women and men sample consist of women and men between 50 and 64 years
old with no or older children (youngest child at least 13 years old).
All specifications include covariates: education, age, marital status and age of the youngest
child as well as province and year fixed effects. Standard error in all specifications are clustered
at province-year level. 2015 is the base year.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.4: QPIP Effect on the Hourly Wage
Younger women Older women Younger men Older men
Quebec*After -0.0241∗∗∗ -0.0215∗∗ -0.0273∗∗∗ -0.0113
(0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0095)
Mean DV 2.72 2.88 2.86 3.11
R2 0.42 0.24 0.40 0.17
N 1394728 631752 1543681 612689
Province&year FE YES YES YES YES
All covariates YES YES YES YES
Clustered std. e. YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents the difference-in-difference hourly wage regression results separately
for each demographic group. Younger women and men samples consists of women and men
between 17 and 49 years old with no or young children (youngest child below 5 years). Older
women and men sample consist of women and men between 50 and 64 years old with no or
older children (youngest child at least 13 years old).
All specifications include covariates: education, age, marital status and age of the youngest
child. Specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) include province and year fixed effects. Standard error
in all specifications are clustered at province-year level.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.5: QPIP effect on the Probability of Employment: Bartik Included
Younger women Older women Younger men Older men
Quebec*After 0.0168∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0086 -0.0119∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0046)
Bartik -0.2832∗ -0.3627∗∗∗ 0.0288 -0.4589∗∗
(0.1599) (0.1231) (0.1643) (0.1906)
Mean DV 0.73 0.59 0.78 0.70
R2 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.13
N 2122089 1328309 2286983 1242603
Province&year FE YES YES YES YES
All covariates YES YES YES YES
Clustered std. e. YES YES YES YES
Note: This table presents the difference-in-difference regression results separately for each de-
mographic group. Younger women and men samples consists of women and men between 17
and 49 years old with no or young children (youngest child below 5 years). Older women and
men sample consist of women and men between 50 and 64 years old with no or older children
(youngest child at least 13 years old).
All specifications include covariates: education, age, marital status and age of the youngest
child. Specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) include province and year fixed effects. Standard error
in all specifications are clustered at province-year level.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3·1: Likelihood of Employment by Year and Demographic
Group
(a) Younger women
Test for pre-trend differences: p-value=0.3868
(b) Older women
Test for pre-trend differences: p-value= 0.5987
(c) Younger men
Test for pre-trend differences: p-value=0.3070
(d) Older men
Test for pre-trend differences: p-value=0.8661
Note: This figure plots the likelihood of employment trends for each demographic
group, separately for Quebec and the control group. Younger women and men
samples consists of women and men between 17 and 49 years old with no or young
children (youngest child below 5 years). Older women and men sample consist of
women and men between 50 and 64 years old with no or older children (youngest
child at least 13 years old).
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Figure 3·2: The Effect of QPIP on the Probability of Employment:
Quebec Year Specific Coefficients From Table 3.3
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(d) Older men
Note: This figure plots the year-specific coefficients from regression (3.12) for each
demographic group. Younger women and men samples consists of women and men
between 17 and 49 years old with no or young children (youngest child below 5
years). Older women and men sample consist of women and men between 50 and
64 years old with no or older children (youngest child at least 13 years old). The
year 2005 is omitted.
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Table A.2: The Effect of LNS on Crime Group Outcomes Based on the Proximity
to MBTA Stops: Poisson Estimation
Period 1: LNS Launch
Dep. Var. Property Crime Violent Crime
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.0245 0.1379 -0.3141 -0.1961 0.0501 0.3542∗
(0.1259) (0.1315) (0.2104) (0.1201) (0.1400) (0.1909)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV
Period 2: LNS Termination
Dep. Var. Property Crime Violent Crime
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LNS Term. x Late Night -0.2281 -0.3178∗ -0.3516 -0.7506∗∗∗ -0.2159 -0.2197
(0.1905) (0.1806) (0.2325) (0.1861) (0.1659) (0.2298)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToD FE X X X X X X
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant
crime incidents from LNS-active MBTA stops. Included are three groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200
500m, and 3) above 500m from an MBTA stop. In Period 2, I exclude MBTA stops that were
part of bus lines eliminated from LNS (as described in the Background). I utilize a difference-
in-difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:153:00 a.m. in Period 1 and 12:152:30 a.m.
in Period 2) represent the treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the
control group. In all regressions, I control for month and day of the week*time of the day fixed
effects. Violent crime includes simple and aggravated assault, robbery, homicide, and harassment
(only present in Period 2 data). Property crime consists of residential, commercial and other
burglary, motor vehicle and other larceny and motor vehicle theft. The regressions use Boston
Police Department's Incident Report data from 2013 to 2017. Omitted are holidays and June
2015 (due to missing data).
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.3: The Effect of LNS on Crime Group Outcomes Based on the Proximity
to Late Night Venues: Poisson Estimation
Period 1: LNS Launch
Dep. Var. Property Crime Violent Crime
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LNS Launch x Late Night 0.0206 -0.0856 -0.0415 0.0353 -0.0440 -0.2856∗
(0.1122) (0.1756) (0.1693) (0.1242) (0.1749) (0.1461)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV
Period 2: LNS Termination
Dep. Var. Property Crime Violent Crime
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LNS Term. x Late Night -0.3101∗ -0.4268∗∗ -0.0720 -0.5208∗∗∗ -0.4282∗ -0.1256
(0.1747) (0.1999) (0.2424) (0.1718) (0.2488) (0.1942)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToD FE X X X X X X
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant
crime incidents from late night liquor venues. Included are three distance groups: 1) 0200m,
2) 200500m, and 3) above 500m from a late night venue. I utilize a difference-in-difference
strategy. Late weekend nights (12:153:00 a.m. in Period 1 and 12:152:30 a.m. in Period 2)
represent the treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group.
In all regressions, I control for month and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. Violent
crime includes simple and aggravated assault, robbery, homicide, and harassment (only present
in Period 2 data). Property crime consists of residential, commercial and other burglary, motor
vehicle and other larceny and motor vehicle theft. The regressions use Boston Police Department's
Incident Report data from 2013 to 2017. Omitted are holidays and June 2015 (due to missing
data).
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.7: Period 1: The Effect of LNS Launch on Individual Crime Outcomes Based on the
Proximity to MBTA stops: Using OLS
Property Crime
Dep. Var. All Burglary Auto Theft
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.1389 0.0567 -0.0255 0.0091 0.2021∗∗ 0.0027
(0.1067) (0.0981) (0.0689) (0.0805) (0.1009) (0.0808)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV 0.29 0.30 0.15 0.21 0.30 0.19
Dep. Var. MV Larceny Other Larceny
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night 0.0228 0.3270∗ -0.0167 0.1624 -0.0440 -0.1224
(0.1718) (0.1722) (0.1469) (0.2034) (0.1695) (0.1088)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV 0.74 0.75 0.47 1.28 0.79 0.36
Violent Crime
Dep. Var. Simple Assault Aggravated Assault
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.2428 -0.0016 0.2714∗ -0.1950 0.0259 0.0151
(0.2364) (0.1982) (0.1504) (0.1489) (0.1354) (0.0935)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV 1.55 1.12 0.58 0.60 0.49 0.25
Dep. Var. Robbery
0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.2152∗ -0.0659 0.1032
(0.1194) (0.1275) (0.0794)
N 480 480 480
Mean DV 0.45 0.38 0.19
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToW X X X X X X
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant crime
incidents from LNS-active MBTA stops. Included are three groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200500m, and 3) above
500m from an MBTA stop. I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:153:00
a.m.) represent the treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group. In all
regressions, I control for month and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. All regressions use Boston
Police Department's Incident Report data from 2013 to 2015. Omitted are holidays and June 2015 (due to
missing data).
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.8: Period 2: The Effect of LNS Termination on Individual Crime Outcomes Based on the
Proximity to MBTA stops: Using OLS
Property Crime
Dep. Var. All Burglary Auto Theft
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.0564 -0.0478 -0.0911 0.0163 -0.0515 -0.1101
(0.1047) (0.1285) (0.1104) (0.0849) (0.0969) (0.0933)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 0.21 0.31 0.24 0.14 0.19 0.19
Dep. Var. MV Larceny Other Larceny
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.0861 -0.0007 0.0037 0.0579 0.0314 0.0153
(0.2126) (0.1614) (0.1201) (0.1596) (0.1398) (0.1249)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 0.86 0.56 0.32 0.50 0.41 0.34
Violent Crime
Dep. Var. Simple Assault Aggravated Assault
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.7129∗∗∗ -0.2160 -0.0589 -0.1965 0.0304 -0.0488
(0.2100) (0.1903) (0.1654) (0.1435) (0.1430) (0.1465)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 0.85 0.80 0.54 0.40 0.40 0.37
Dep. Var. Robbery Harassment
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.2051∗ 0.0403 -0.1514 -0.0631 -0.1131∗ -0.0426
(0.1101) (0.0856) (0.1036) (0.0571) (0.0649) (0.0658)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.06 0.09 0.11
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToW X X X X X X
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant crime incidents from
LNS-active MBTA stops. Included are three groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200500m, and 3) above 500m from an MBTA
stop. I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:152:30 a.m.) represent the treated group
and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group. In all regressions, I control for month and day
of the week*time of the day fixed effects. All regressions use Boston Police Department's Incident Report data from
2015 to 2017.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.9: Period 1: The Effect of LNS Launch on Individual Crime Outcomes Based on the
Proximity to MBTA stops: Using Poisson
Property Crime
Dep. Var. All Burglary Auto Theft
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.5709 0.1492 -0.1443 -0.1127 0.5953
(0.3814) (0.3276) (0.4888) (0.4522) (0.3636)
N 480 480 464 480 464
Mean DV
Dep. Var. MV Larceny Other Larceny
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.0631 -0.1301 -0.4341 0.1072 -0.0188
(0.2470) (0.2699) (0.3318) (0.1616) (0.2101)
N 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV
Violent Crime
Dep. Var. Simple Assault Aggravated Assault
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.1247 0.0549 0.0213 -0.2861 0.2100
(0.1556) (0.1741) (0.3704) (0.2689) (0.2808)
N 480 480 460 480 480
Mean DV
Dep. Var. Robbery
0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.4803∗ -0.1391 0.5244
(0.2682) (0.3307) (0.4052)
N 480 480 452
Mean DV
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToW X X X X X X
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant crime
incidents from LNS-active MBTA stops. Included are three groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200500m, and 3) above
500m from an MBTA stop. I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:153:00
a.m.) represent the treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group. In
all regressions, I control for month and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. All regressions use
Boston Police Department's Incident Report data from 2013 to 2015. Omitted are holidays and June 2015
(due to missing data).
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.10: Period 2: The Effect of LNS Termination on Individual Crime Outcomes Based on the
Proximity to MBTA stops: Using Poisson
Property Crime
Dep. Var. All Burglary Auto Theft
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.4976 -0.5511 -1.2426∗∗ 0.0200 -0.7498 -0.6878
(0.4682) (0.3782) (0.4850) (0.7448) (0.5109) (0.5115)
N 432 450 434 386 444 450
Mean DV
Dep. Var. MV Larceny Other Larceny
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.2807 -0.1381 0.5896 -0.0460 -0.0353 -0.0894
(0.2714) (0.3187) (0.5744) (0.3417) (0.3616) (0.4325)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV
Violent Crime
Dep. Var. Simple Assault Aggravated Assault
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.8374∗∗∗ -0.3155 0.0849 -0.4710 0.0380 -0.1269
(0.2396) (0.2196) (0.3245) (0.3237) (0.3213) (0.3732)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV
Dep. Var. Robbery Harassment
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -1.0453∗∗ 0.7317 -0.8374∗ -0.9400 -1.3024 -0.0983
(0.4347) (0.5991) (0.4426) (1.0660) (0.8240) (0.8140)
N 446 424 462 282 344 366
Mean DV
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToW X X X X X X
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant crime incidents from
LNS-active MBTA stops. Included are three groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200500m, and 3) above 500m from an MBTA
stop. I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:152:30 a.m.) represent the treated group
and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group. In all regressions, I control for month and day
of the week*time of the day fixed effects. All regressions use Boston Police Department's Incident Report data from
2015 to 2017.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.11: Period 1: The Effect of LNS Launch on Individual Crime Outcomes in the
Proximity of Late Night Venues: Using OLS
Property Crime
Dep. Var. All Burglary Auto Theft
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.1435 -0.0008 0.0367 0.0621 0.0826 0.0692
(0.1031) (0.0875) (0.0891) (0.0789) (0.0798) (0.0978)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.31
Dep. Var. MV Larceny Other Larceny
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night 0.3415∗ -0.0131 0.0048 -0.0396 0.0631 -0.0275
(0.1802) (0.1429) (0.1463) (0.2229) (0.1215) (0.1155)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV 0.83 0.56 0.57 1.59 0.42 0.42
Violent Crime
Dep. Var. Simple Assault Aggravated Assault
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night 0.2573 0.0228 -0.2533 -0.1081 0.0370 -0.0828
(0.2652) (0.1456) (0.1714) (0.1607) (0.0984) (0.1309)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV 1.79 0.60 0.85 0.66 0.25 0.42
Dep. Var. Robbery
0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.0856 -0.0961 0.0038
(0.1193) (0.1127) (0.1001)
N 480 480 480
Mean DV 0.39 0.33 0.30
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToW X X X X X X
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant crime
incidents from late night liquor venues. Included are three distance groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200500m and 3)
above 500m from a late night venue. I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy, where weekend nights (12:15
- 3:00 a.m.) represent the treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group.
In all regressions, I control for month and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. All regressions use
Boston Police Department's Incident Report data from 2013 to 2015.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.12: Period 2: The Effect of LNS Termination on Individual Crime Outcomes in the Proximity
of Late Night Venues: Using OLS
Property Crime
Dep. Var. All Burglary Auto Theft
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.1816∗ -0.0814 0.0678 0.0158 -0.0334 -0.1277
(0.1095) (0.1088) (0.1201) (0.0822) (0.0921) (0.1022)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.15 0.16 0.22
Dep. Var. MV Larceny Other Larceny
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Terminationx Late Night -0.1069 0.1257 -0.1020 0.1391 -0.1589 0.1245
(0.2371) (0.1275) (0.1248) (0.1565) (0.1224) (0.1287)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 1.05 0.35 0.35 0.55 0.33 0.38
Violent Crime
Dep. Var. Simple Assault Aggravated Assault
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.7503∗∗∗ -0.0067 -0.2309 -0.1401 -0.0436 -0.0312
(0.2500) (0.1538) (0.1591) (0.1517) (0.1073) (0.1771)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 1.15 0.46 0.58 0.47 0.24 0.47
Dep. Var. Robbery Harassment
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.1403 -0.2096∗∗ 0.0337 -0.0700 -0.1274∗∗ -0.0213
(0.1011) (0.0953) (0.1073) (0.0542) (0.0617) (0.0690)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV 0.22 0.17 0.26 0.06 0.09 0.11
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToW X X X X X X
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant crime incidents
from late night venues. Included are three distance groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200500m, and 3) above 500m from a
late night venue. I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:152:30 a.m.) represent the
treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group. In all regressions, I control for
month and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. All regressions use Boston Police Department's Incident
Report data from 2015 to 2017.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.13: Period 1: The Effect of LNS Launch on Individual Crime Outcomes in the
Proximity of Late Night Venues: Using Poisson
Property Crime
Dep. Var. All Burglary Auto Theft
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.6045 -0.0407 -0.0287 0.3833 0.1217 0.2303
(0.4031) (0.3872) (0.4006) (0.4603) (0.4192) (0.3406)
N 464 464 464 460 464 464
Mean DV
Dep. Var. MV Larceny Other Larceny
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night 0.0640 -0.4328 -0.0425 -0.0167 0.2281 -0.1841
(0.2433) (0.2936) (0.2761) (0.1379) (0.3465) (0.2918)
N 480 480 480 480 480 480
Mean DV
Violent Crime
Dep. Var. Simple Assault Aggravated Assault
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night 0.1468 0.0050 -0.3492∗ -0.1966 0.0142 -0.2000
(0.1574) (0.2344) (0.1974) (0.2726) (0.4070) (0.3033)
N 480 480 480 480 464 480
Mean DV
Dep. Var. Robbery
0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Launch x Late Night -0.1401 -0.2713 -0.1538
(0.3187) (0.3347) (0.3386)
N 480 480 480
Mean DV
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToW X X X X X X
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant crime
incidents from late night venues. Included are three distance groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200500m and 3) above
500m from a late night venue. I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy, where weekend nights (12:15 - 3:00
a.m.) represent the treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group. In all
regressions, I control for month and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. All regressions use Boston
Police Department's Incident Report data from 2013 to 2015.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Table A.14: Period 2: The Effect of LNS Termination on Individual Crime Outcomes in the Proximity
of Late Night Venues: Using Poisson
Property Crime
Dep. Var. All Burglary Auto Theft
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -1.0123∗∗ -1.0563∗∗ -0.0097 -0.3024 -0.6063 -0.4826
(0.4256) (0.4392) (0.4342) (0.6323) (0.5273) (0.5670)
N 410 430 450 404 432 450
Mean DV
Dep. Var. MV Larceny Other Larceny
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.1961 0.4265 -0.4281 -0.1564 -0.3953 0.4325
(0.2492) (0.4678) (0.4958) (0.2929) (0.4258) (0.4338)
N 462 462 462 462 462 462
Mean DV
Violent Crime
Dep. Var. Simple Assault Aggravated Assault
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.5741∗∗∗ -0.0259 -0.2533 -0.2390 -0.2272 -0.0561
(0.2176) (0.3171) (0.3038) (0.3006) (0.4232) (0.3420)
N 462 462 462 462 444 462
Mean DV
Dep. Var. Robbery Harassment
0-200m 200-500m >500m 0-200m 200-500m >500m
LNS Termination x Late Night -0.7672∗ -1.3356∗∗ -0.0014 -0.8238 -1.4162 -0.3017
(0.4285) (0.5939) (0.3970) (1.2734) (1.0405) (0.6541)
N 430 418 434 294 300 406
Mean DV
Month FE X X X X X X
DoW*ToW X X X X X X
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Note: This table presents result of a spatial analysis, which is based on the distance of relevant crime incidents
from late night venues. Included are three distance groups: 1) 0200m, 2) 200500m, and 3) above 500m from a
late night venue. I utilize a difference-in-difference strategy. Late weekend nights (12:152:30 a.m.) represent the
treated group and weekend evenings (8:0011:15 p.m.) serve as the control group. In all regressions, I control for
month and day of the week*time of the day fixed effects. All regressions use Boston Police Department's Incident
Report data from 2015 to 2017.
** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
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Figure A·1: The Aggregate Composition of Weekend Ridership by
Hour of the Day
Note: This graph presents the composition of weekend hourly ridership data by the number of
MBTA gated entries. It demonstrates that there are almost no zero observations in the dataset. At
the same time, there are a lot of missing and relatively small ridership observations (below or equal
to ten entries), particularly during the late weekend night hours. The statistic contains ridership
data from 6 p.m to 3 a.m. on weekends, from September 2013 to December 2017.
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